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66 Executive summary 
Our  analysis  of the  European-American  employment  gap  and the  earnings  mobility 
record of  four European  economies (France,  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and the  UK) 
relative to the US does not endorse the bleak picture of  a 'sclerotic' Europe which fails to 
match the  wage flexibility of the  US.  The  employment gap  in  the European economies 
continues to pose challenges, but these economies have areas of  significant achievement. 
More  strikingly,  the  stereotype  of wage  rigidity  in  the  European  economies  is  not 
confirmed.  This  has  important  implications  for  the  assessment  of policies  towards 
improving the employment position in EU economies. 
Purpose 
The report summarises most
1 of the results of an  extensive data research project, which 
served the purpose of a comprehensive international comparison between four European 
countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and the United 
States, of: 
•  First, the ean1ings structure of  employment. Both the situation in  the mid-1990s and 
the evolution since 1979 were recorded. Below this is referred to as 'benchmarking'. 
•  Second, the ean1ings mobility of  individuals across the distribution. This was mainly 
done for the 1990s. Here the reference is 'mobility'. 
In addition, special attention was paid to the aspects of individual literacy and job quality. 
Benchmarking 
The  comparisons  were  made  for  a  series  of  personal  characteristics  (gender,  age, 
education, ethnicity) and job characteristics (industry, type of contract, size of enterprise) 
or a  combination  of both  (full-/part-time,  seniority).  The  approach  adopted  has  two 
1  The comparative  evaluation of the  European  Structure  of Earnings  Survey  ESES  and  the  European 
Community Household Panel ECHP is left out here. See the full benchmarking report. vi  European-American Employment Gap 
significant properties that aim to expand the existing knowledge of wage inequalities and 
employment. 
•  the comparisons cover total employment, including part-time jobs alongside full-time 
jobs and  thus  accounting  for  the  rapid  growth  of part-time  employment  and  the 
significant international  differences  in  its  incidence.  Consequently,  the  results  are 
based throughout on  the full  population of hourly wages, adding important insights 
on the earnings distribution of employment measured in terms of hours worked (the 
'hours approach') alongside  the  usual  measurement in  terms  of persons  working 
('the head count approach'). 
•  the comparisons also address the earnings structure as a whole including an  explicit 
study of high pay, based on  the definition as  wages over 150 per cent (3/2) of the 
national median wage (mirroring that of low pay defined as below two-thirds of the 
median). Intermediate pay is defined as being between these two cut-offs. 
The analysis has generated several new 'stylised facts': 
•  It underlines  the  significance  of including  part-time  jobs  in  international  com-
parisons.  Their incidence  in  employment differs  substantially - but  note  that  the 
American hours  volume equals the German and the French - and in the European 
countries it is growing significantly. Also, part-time jobs occupy different positions 
in  the earnings distribution, concentrated on low pay in the United States and more 
polarised between low and high pay elsewhere. 
•  It reh~forces tlze  general picture of eanzings inequality as being much higher in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries compared to the Continent, as the French earnings dispersion 
and  incidence  of  low  pay  are  brought  closer  to  the  German  level  and  British 
inequality and incidence closer to the American level. 
•  It  enzplzasises  the  important  role  of high-wage  enzployment  as  an  element of the 
international differences. The transatlantic employment gap is essentially two-tailed 
as  the United States has  a larger incidence of both  low  pay and high  pay.  At the 
intermediate levels of pay the Continental countries have an  employment advantage. 
This, however, is much smaller for hours worked than for persons working and it is 
gradually decreasing over time. This is further strengthened by the finding that since 
1979, on  balance,  American employment growth  has  been stronger for high-wage 
employment than for low-wage employment. Executive Summary  Vll 
•  This observation is particularly relevant for women. The transatlantic employment 
gap (and its growth since 1979!) is virtually identical with a higher level of female 
employment and the gap is particularly significant for high-wage employment. Also, 
two-thirds of American female employment growth has been in high-wage jobs. The 
European countries fail to match this. For men, longer working hours in the USA and 
the UK are an  important constituent of the employment gap.  Also, American men 
have been fully 'responsible' for the growth in low-wage employment since 1979. 
Starting from the fact that the incidence of low and high pay is substantially higher in the 
United States, we have  looked at the national  structures of pay inequalities relative to 
these differing levels ('the relative risk of low or high pay'). 
•  The structures of pay inequalities appear to  be  strikingly  sinzilar  across  the  five 
countries. The same categories have comparable relative risks of either low pay or 
high pay.  However, the range of relative risk is  even wider in Europe than  in  the 
United States. Certain groups in individual European countries run an  even higher 
absolute risk of being low paid (e.g. youths, hotel and catering workers) or high paid 
(e.g. managers, professionals, men working part-time, employees in utilities). 
•  Particularly, the low-paying* industries are quasi universal: agriculture, retail trade, 
hotels and catering and personal services, while the high-paying industries are much 
more difficult to  pin down. The high-wage employment gap seems to  relate  more 
strongly  to  personal  characteristics,  as  the  role  of  American  women  already 
suggests, than to industry. In the industries that pay high wages in the United States 
(30 per cent or more above the average), Europe has an employment advantage (but 
European wages in  these industries are  not necessarily high). European high-wage 
industries pay wages that stand out further above the average than American high-
wage industries. 
Mobility 
The findings  from  examining earnings mobility at  the individual level  across the four 
selected European  economies,  and  between  them  and  the  United  States,  do  not  give 
*  Industries are defined here by their average level of pay. Vlll  European-American Employment Gap 
systematic  support  to  the  vtew  of rigid  labour  markets  111  the  European  economies 
inhibiting job growth. Specifically: 
•  each  of the  European  economies,  with  the  exception  of France,  shows  greater 
earnings mobility than the United States; and France is level with the USA; 
•  the mobility record, in terms of the proportion escaping from low-paid employment 
in any one year, is found to be very similar across the five economies; 
•  however, transitions from low pay to non-employment are clearly higher in the UK, 
while the United States is very similar to France and Germany; 
•  the  highest degree of upward earnings mobility from  the bottom deciles occurs in 
France and Germany, with the United States again in a middle ranking; 
•  upwards earnings progression by those returning from unemployment is less frequent 
in the United States than in any of the European economies with the exception of the 
Netherlands, and substantially less frequent than in the UK. 
Turning  to  real  wage  rigidity,  in  terms  of downwards  earnings  change  for  workers 
continuing in  employment, with or without a job change,  the evidence again does not 
support wage rigidity in the European economies by contrast to the USA. Rather: 
•  a significant minority (25% to 45%) of workers experience reductions in real hourly 
earnings in a given year in all countries; 
•  downwards earnings adjustment is as frequent in  the European economies as in the 
United States; 
•  at  the  individual  level  wages  show  a substantial  degree of downwards  as  well  as 
upwards flexibility, in the European economies as much as in the United States. 
A key role is found for job mobility. In general, job-changing results in increased real and 
relative  earnings.  There are  cross-country  differences  in  patterns  of job-changing, but 
pointing  to  wage  flexibility  common  to  the  United  States  and  individual  European 
countries, rather than to a United States/Europe divide: 
•  in  France and  Germany most job-changing is  by  individuals in  the  middle of the 
earnings distribution, while in the USA and the UK it mainly concerns workers in the 
upper and lower tails; Executive Summary  IX 
•  job-changing with an intervening period of non-employment involves real  earnings 
reductions for large proportions of workers in the USA, France and the UK. 
In addition to the benchmarking results on the significance of the role of women for the 
transatlantic emplo.vment  gap  and the  severe  under-representation  of women  in  high-
wage jobs, particularly in Europe, we find that: 
•  European  women  working  part-time  in  Europe  are  in  the  childcare  years;  in  the 
United States they are approaching retirement; 
•  women, particularly those working part-tip1e, are heavily concentrated in  low wage 
jobs; 
•  part-time work carries a substantial pay penalty; 
•  this persists after the resumption of full-time work. 
Young persons feature prominently in the processes of  ean1ings and job mobility. 
•  for most young workers low  paid employment is a transitory situation from  which 
they move into better paid employment; 
•  there is evidence of a declining rate of return to education. 
Literacy 
The International Adult Literacy Survey provides internationally more uniform data on 
cognitive skills than the usual classification of formal educational credentials. This was 
used to investigate the effects of liberal versus more regulated labour markets on the role 
of skills for pay and employment. Five Anglo-Saxon countries were compared to  five 
Continental  countries  (unfortunately  without  France).  The  main  finding  is  that  the 
situation  of the  low  skilled  for  both  pay  and employment  combined is  better in  the 
Continental  countries  than  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  world.  This  contradicts  Krugman's 
hypothesis of a trade-off between higher levels of pay and lower levels of employment. 
By  contrast,  the  hypothesis  stating  that  a  favourable  supply  of low-skilled  workers 
compared to demand can lead to higher wages and better employment perspectives at the 
same time is broadly consistent with the data: However, the support is limited by the fact 
the approach was unable to explain the variance of the situation of the low skilled within 
the two country groups, Anglo-Saxon versus Continental. X  European-American Employment Gap 
Job quality 
The analysis of job satisfaction indicates that promotion prospects and career progression 
tend to  be  more  important than  pay levels  in  promoting job satisfaction,  and that the 
extent of training provided makes a further positive contribution. 
Recommendations 
On  the employment gap, our analysis reveals clear areas of strong performance by the 
European economies. In  what can be termed the jobs 'heartland' - jobs at intermediate 
levels of earnings - their employment rates exceed American levels, particularly in full-
time jobs for men. 
An area of strong performance by the EU economies has been in the growth of part  -time 
work. This continues to be predominantly a female activity, but its role for men has also 
been expanding. This is an important development in allowing individuals more flexible 
patterns of labour market involvement. This is particularly advantageous for women, but 
contributes also for younger and older workers. 
Further, on the full-time equivalence measure, a significant part of the employment gap 
emerges from the shorter hours worked in the European economies. It is not clear that it 
should be an objective for the EU countries to try to match the part of employment rates 
attributable to the longer hours worked by American men. 
However,  while  the  employment gap  is  not universal,  and its  total  elimination not  an 
appropriate  objective,  a  significant jobs deficit  undeniably  remains,  and  its  reduction 
would bring significant economic and social  benefits to  the  European  economies.  Our 
analysis points to four areas of concern: 
The  largest  single  source  of the  jobs  deficit  is  in  jobs  for  women.  In  this  area  the 
European economies have failed to match the employment growth achieved in  the US. 
The growth of part-time employment has provided only a modest offset to this. This is an 
area clearly calling for active policies. 
We have identified a clear and substantial jobs deficit in high-wage jobs in the European 
economies.  In  part  this  follows  from  the  lower  degree  of inequality  in  the  earnings 
distributions. But even with this adjustment a deficit remains. This deficit in high-wage 
jobs applies particularly forcefully in  the case of high-wage jobs for women, where the 
numbers in the EU economies are shamefully low. Executive Summary  XI 
Our analysis confirms the employment gap in low-wage jobs, for both men and women. 
This gap, however, does not pose an  unambiguous challenge. More jobs are better than 
fewer, and our analysis of earnings mobility across the economies and of the youth labour 
market in France confirm that the majority of low-wage jobs are held only on a transient 
basis. Nonetheless, for adult workers, and particularly women, they do serve as a trap. 
While  the  expansion  of part-time  employment  can  be  claimed  as  a  success  for  the 
European economies, the new opportunities in part-time work in the EU economies have 
been disproportionately in  low-paid jobs. Even more worryingly, the study of part-time 
work for women in  the UK has indicated not only a current wage disadvantage to part-
time work, but a continuing disadvantage even after a return to full-time work. 
From a policy perspective,  our main  recommendation  is  that  it  is  highly important to 
focus on  the growth of high-wage jobs,  and how this can  be stimulated in  Europe. The 
deficit in  high-wage jobs would seem to lie more with the limited demand for skills by 
firms in the European economies than with shortfalls in their supply. However, pursuing 
the  growth of particular industries seems to  offer little  scope for furthering high-wage 
employment - there is no clear-cut American example worth imitating. The jobs deficit 
applies particularly to  female  employment at  higher levels of pay.  The extremely low 
levels in Europe again do not appear to signal a shortage in the supply of skilled women, 
but rather a lack of advancement. The rising educational attainment of women, followed 
by their low employment rates, reinforces the untapped potential. Improving the labour 
market position of women overall may be the most effective approach. 
In  regard to  the  deficit in  low-wage jobs, the  recommendation is  a negative  one.  Our 
findings that the extent of earnings mobility is at least as great in the European economies 
as  in  the  US,  has  a  major policy  implication:  downwards  wage  adjustment,  whether 
through the weakening of wage-setting institutions or otherwise, does not present itself as 
a necessary, or even appropriate, response to the low employment rate. On the positive 
side,  the  analysis  of job  satisfaction  indicates  that  promotion  prospects  and  career 
progression tend to be more important than pay levels in promoting job satisfaction, and 
that the extent of training provided makes a further positive contribution. This suggests 
that policies towards low-wage jobs should centre 011  their quality at least as importantly 
as 011 the level of  pay which they provide. Xll  European-American Employment Gap 
Similar issues of job quality relate to  part-time work. The expansion of part-time work 
offers major potential benefits, both economically and socially. These are in danger of 
being undermined by the low quality of much part-time work, both in the current rewards 
which  it gives  and,  even  more significantly, in  its  implications for future  careers. The 
wage penalty in future earnings deriving from past part-time work can easily be seen as a 
significant contributor to the low presence of women in  high-wage jobs. With the rapid 
growth  of part-time work  the  poor quality of part-time jobs emerges as a  sign~ficant 
threat to women's labour market progress. 
Finally, in  terms of macroeconomic stances, our study suggests the employment gap in 
the European economies should be seen as arising over a period characterised by adverse 
demand  shocks  originating  with  anti-inflationary  nzonetary  and fiscal  stances  and 
subsequent  hysteresis,  rather  than  a  period  of wage  rigidity  brought  about  by 
inappropriate wage-setting institutions. The degree of earnings flexibility and earnings 
mobility  in  the  European  economies  is  substantial.  The challenge  is  to  ensure that  it 
brings career progression and job quality. 
Future research 
A main implication from  our work is the importance of exploiting national data at the 
microeconomic level in  a comparative framework. The opportunity to make systematic 
use of these at the European level has been hampered by the tabular nature of the ESES 
data.  The systematic decomposition  by low-wage and high-wage employment - which, 
unfortunately,  was  crowded  out  from  the  present  project  - would  provide  a  highly 
valuable addition to the aggregate knowledge gained by the present research. Our results 
apply to the four European countries mentioned above. 
There are three important areas for further investigation to be derived from these results 
and recommendations. They include: 
•  the role of high-wage jobs, particularly in services and for women; 
•  the threat to earnings inequality from the growth of part-time work; 
•  the  role  of part-time  work  in  career progression,  particularly  for  potential  high-
earners, implying further scrutiny of the role of job quality and pay in  relation  to 
activities performed outside the labour market, in households or education. Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This report presents the main results of a study undertaken by an international consortium 
of labour market researchers at the request of the Directorate-General of Employment and 
Social Affairs of the European Commission. The research was motivated by the jobs gap 
between the United States and the European Union, and aimed at relating this gap to pay 
at both the aggregate and the individual level. This was combined with other issues as 
will be explained below. At the DG ESA the study was initiated by Ruth Paserman and 
Georg  Fischer  and  its  progress  was  later  supervised by Els  van  Winckel  and  Georg 
Fischer. We thank them for their co-operation. 
Unfortunately, it was impossible to cover all EU countries in depth throughout the study. 
Four haven been chosen (France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) that give strong, 
often contrasting, representation to many of the key features of European labour markets. 
Germany, France and the UK are the three largest economies in the EU. In the UK and 
the  Netherlands  employment rates  are  relatively  high  and  have  been  rising,  while  in 
France and Germany they are lower and have been falling. Earnings inequality is high in 
the UK and quite low in the Netherlands and Germany. In Germany collective bargaining 
is the norm, supported by the extension of bargained outcomes throughout the sector. In 
France the role of the national minimum wage is strong. The UK, on the other hand, has 
placed  emphasis  on  individualization  in  wage-setting  as  well  as  the  deregulation  of 
employment more widely. However, the country coverage was also broader in one part of 
the research, including various other countries (see ESES/ECHP evaluation and literacy 
below), and more restricted in another part, stressing one of the five countries including 
the USA (see individual contributions below). 
The present report only summarises the  outcomes and further detail  can be found in  a 
number of separate  publications  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  project  as  a  whole  had  a 
broader scope than is reported here. Particularly, regarding the benchmarking it should be 2  European-American Employment Gap 
noted that the  research  also  included an  evaluation of two new European datasets:  the 
European Structure of  Earnings Survey  1995/96 (ESES) and the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP). These were compared to each other for most EU countries on 
the  one  hand  and to  national  data for  the  four  above EU countries on  the  other.  The 
comparison  was  made on  the  basis  of tabular data from  the ESES  made available by 
Eurostat - we like to thank Ana Nobre and Brigitte Delville for their co-operation. This 
second aim of the project elaborated on the recommendation concerning ESES given by 
the  European  Low-Wage  Employment  Research  network  LoWER  in  its  1997  report 
Statistical Data available  on  Low-Wage  Employment in  the  European  Unions  and Its 
Member States. Consequently, the benchmarking research as  a whole included this two-
sided  evaluation  as  well  as  the  transatlantic  comparison  which  is  indeed  summarised 
below.  All  results are  reported in  full  detail  in  the report entitled Benchmarking Low-
Wage  and High-Wage  Employment in  Europe  and the  United States,  A  study of New 
European Datasets and National Data for France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the  United States (or "Table Book"). This report will  be made available 
through the website of the above Directorate-General. 
Second, more detail has become available than could be usefully reported here. Only the 
main results have been taken from a series of individual contributions that were made by 
members of the consortium, who considered a number of issues in more detail: 
•  Peter Gottschalk treated the effects of job mobility on  earnings with a focus on the 
United States 
•  Andries de Grip and Geralt Nekkers discussed skills for the four European countries, 
•  Sara Connolly and Mary Gregory considered gender, part-time work and pay with a 
focus on theUK, 
•  Rannia Leontaridi  and Peter Sloane  contributed on  the  role  of job quality,  again 
starting from the British situation, 
•  Stephen Bazen dealt with youth and earnings mobility, primarily for France, and 
•  Peter  Mlihlau  and  Justine  Horgan  analysed  the  literacy  data  available  from  the 
International Adult Literacy Survey set up by Statistics Canada and the OECD. 
The full text of their contributions is made available as working papers trough the website 
of the  LoWER  network  (see  the  attached  List  of  underlying  reports).  The  present Chapter 1: Introduction  3 
summary is the responsibility of the authors of this report who acted as the core team of 
the consortium. 
In  addition to the two aims of the study already mentioned, relating the jobs gap to pay 
and evaluating the European dataset, a third intention was to discuss first thoughts on job 
quality to help drafting the agenda for future research. This has been done by Leontaridi 
and Sloane in the paper mentioned above. 
Finally,  it  was  originally  intended  to  also  consider  earnings  mobility  in  relation  to 
literacy, and not only to the formal level of skill. Unfortunately, the data were insufficient 
for this purpose and in  stead the effects of literacy on  pay and employment have been 
considered  more  broadly.  Two  hypotheses  explaining  pay  and  employment,  biased 
technological change or supply and demand of skills, were discussed in the above paper 
by Mtihlau and Horgan. 
In  contrast  to  the  ESES/ECHP evaluation,  both  are  reported  below,  in  a  stand-alone 
format. 
The outcomes are presented in  the following sequence.  First, Chapter 2 deals  with  the 
benchmarking.  Chapter  3  considers  the  range  of earnings  mobility  issues.  Finally, 
Chapter  4  summarises  the  results  on  literacy  and  job  quality.  All  conclusions  and 
recommendations are listed in the Executive Summary. 
Scheme 1 presents an overview of the project as a whole, detailing its parts, contributions 
and publications. The parts indicated in bold are covered in this report. Those in italic are 
published in more detail elsewhere. Scheme I  Overview of  the study 
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!  I  I  ! Chapter 2 
Benchmarking Low-wage and High-wage Employment 
The  first  part  of the  research  project  comprised  a  benchmarking  exercise  aimed  at 
providing  a  detailed  comparative  description  of  the  incidence  and  composition  of 
employment in  the different segments of the earnings distribution - low,  medium and 
high pay-, differentiated by labour force and job characteristics and a mixture of the two 
(gender,  age,  educational  level,  full-time/part-time,  seniority,  industry,  permanent  or 
temporary contract).  Hopefully,  the  result can  serve  as  a point of reference  for future 
studies of international differences in the structure of pay. 
The benchmarking started from  a study  attempting to  evaluate, between countries and 
against  national  data,  the  new  European  data  provided  by  the  European  Structure  of 
Earnings  Survey  (ESES)  and  the  Community Household  Panel.  (ECHP)  survey.  The 
resulting evaluation was included in the separately published report Benchmarking Low-
Wage  and High-Wage  Employment in  Europe and the  United States,  A  study of New 
European Datasets and National Data for France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the  United States.  The objective of an  evaluation, however, explains the 
tabulated nature of the research -the above report is essentially a "table book" as we had 
no  access  to  the  microdata of the ESES  and had to  make do  with  tables  provided on 
request  by  Eurostat.  However,  the  evaluative part is  left out here  as  we  focus  on  the 
transatlantic differences in employment and pay. 
2.1  The approach 
In order to make international comparisons of employment and pay we adopted what we 
have termed 'the hours approach'. Where the typical approach looks at the distribution of 
workers across the earnings distribution, the 'hours approach' focuses on the distribution 
of hours of work across hourly earnings. Several considerations motivate this approach. 
The first is the increasing role of part-time work and differences in this across countries. 6  European-American Employment Gap 
The 'hours approach' enables a comprehensive comparison, taking into account the entire 
economy, full- and part-time workers,  and not  only part of it such as  commonly used 
segments  of men  with  full-time  jobs.  Focusing  on  full-time  workers  can  be  quite 
misleading  as  a  representation  of the  national  economy.  Table  2.1  shows  the  major 
differences between countries in this, with full-time men  ranging from 53 to 61  per cent 
of the total economy and full-time women even more widely, between 18 and 38 per cent 
of the whole economy. The proportion of the part-time economy, men and women taken 
together, varies between 10 per cent for the United States, Germany and France via 15 for 
the  UK  to  21  per  cent  for  the  Netherlands.  Consequently,  the  full-time/part-time 
composition  of the  economy is  an  important determinant of the  national  employment 
input and of its evolution and an  adequate comparison of pay and employment should 
include part-time workers. The only meaningful way to do this is, is by means of full-
time  equivalents  or hours  worked.  A  second reason  is  that  the  average  length  of the 
working week differs significantly, particularly for full-time men. The average length of 
their working week ranges from 38.5 to 45 hours a week, a 16-per cent gap, representing 
1.10 to  1.28 full-time equivalents (FTE),  defined as  a working week of 35  hours. For 
female full-timers the international variation is much less; women are essentially working 
the same hours across countries, and average part-time hours are also quite similar across 
countries.  At the national  level,  the  international  variation  is  relatively small,  with  the 
major  exception  of the  Netherlands,  but  the  above  categories  will  be  concentrated 
differently across the earnings distribution. One should therefore account systematically 
for hours worked also for this reason. .  Given the data available we have done this on a 
weekly basis; on an annual basis the absolute gap between the United States and the four 
European countries will  be even larger (cf.  OECD, Employment Outlook, Table F) but 
the pattern across the pay distribution will likely be unchanged. 
Note that the table also reveals important differences within the EU.  Although the  UK 
lies between the United States and the Continental economies in terms of its participation 
rate it does  not do  so  in  terms of average  working hours - French working hours  are 
longer and German hours are comparable. However, men with full-time jobs in the UK 
work the same long hours as their American counterparts, while in the Netherlands and 
Germany they work substantially shorter hours Chapter 2: Benchmarking and Inequality  7 
Table 2.1  The role of  gender and working hours in the economv, 1996 
United States  France  Germany  Netherlands  United Kingdom 
Employment-to-Population ratio ( 15-64) 
Total (head)  73.9  58.7  65.0  66.3  68.9 
Total (FTE*)  82.0  63.9  65.6  59.3  71.9 
%full-time men  53  57  59  61  56 
%full-time women  38  32  30  18  29 
%part-time men  3  2  1  6  2 
%part-time women  7  8  10  15  13 
f4 verage FTE per person 
Total  1.11  1.09  1.01  0.89  1.04 
full-time men  1.28  1.19  1.10  1.10  1.25 
full-time women  1.15  1.14  1.10  1.09  1.13 
part-time men  0.61  0.66  0.68  0.52  0.63 
part-time women  0.59  0.68  0.60  0.52  0.57 
Full-time equivalent= 35 hours a week. 
Source: national microdatasets, usual weekly hours worked (annual hours may deviate). 
The approach in the present report is comprehensive also in two further respects. First, in 
addition to the study of low pay, separate attention is paid to the upper part or high-wage 
end of the earnings distribution. This is measured as earnings in excess of 150 per cent of 
the median wage - a definition that mirrors the well-known measure of low pay as below 
two-thirds of the median wage. Second, in addition to these two median-related measures 
of pay the comparison is extended to the lowest (first) decile and (first) quartile on the 
one hand, and the highest (fourth) quartile and (tenth) decile on the other, as  alternative 
measures of low and high pay respectively 
Below  we  summarise the  most important outcomes of the  research;  for other aspects, 
further detail and explanation we refer to the separate report mentioned above. 
2.2  Inequality and the incidence of low and high pay 
The hours  approach  to  the analysis of employment and earnings inequality in  the five 
economies  sheds  a  different  light  from  the  usual  head-count  approach  for  all  five 
countries.  The differences  reflect in  particular the  divergent concentration of part-time 
work at the two ends of the pay distribution but also the variation in  hours worked by 
full-time workers. 
Compared to  OECD  data,  which  refer to  full-time  workers  only,  the  hours  approach 
presented in  the FTE column substantially attenuates the level  of overall inequality for 
the United States, France and Germany, while raising it in  the UK (see Table 2.2). The 8  European-American Employment Gap 
Netherlands is hardly affected. The downwards adjustment for France and the upwards 
adjustment for the UK also apply in earlier years, while for the other three countries the 
adjustment is in the opposite direction. Comparing the hours measure to the head count 
from the same national sources of microdata (see Persons column)rather than the OECD 
measures, the adjustments are downward for all countries except France (unchanged) . In 
the United States, Germany and the Netherlands the change primarily affects the lower 
half of the distribution (D5:Dl ratio) while in the UK the upper half changes most. 
Table 2.2  Wage inequality and incidence of  low and high pay in  the USA,  France,  Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, microdata versus OECD data,  199511996 
Inequality  Incidence 
OECD  Persons  FTE  OECD  Persons  FTE 
United States 
D9:D1  4.63  4.49  4.37 
D9:D5  2.19  2.18  2.14  ~  3/2 median  n.a.  26.1  25.6 
D5:D1  2.11  2.05  2.05  :::; 2/3 median  25.0*  25.2  25.5 
France 
D9:D1  3.06  2.60  2.60 
D9:D5  1.91  1.78  1.76  ~  3/2 median  n.a.  18.1  16.9 
D5:D1  1.60  1.46  1.48  :::; 2/3 median  13.3  8.4  8.9 
Germany 
D9:D1  2.86*:  2.80  2.68 
D9:D5  1.79  1.70  1.69  ~  3/2 median  n.a.  15.1  15.1 
D5:D1  1.60  1.64  1.59  :::; 2/3 median  13.3*  13.7  12.6 
Netherlands 
D9:D1  2.82*:  3.12  2.89 
D9:D5  1.72  1.73  1.72  ~  3/2 median  n.a.  16.0  15.7 
D5:D1  1.64  1.80  1.68  :::; 2/3 median  11.9*  16.6  14.4 
United Kingdom 
D9:D1  3.47  4.14  3.98 
D9:D5  1.90  2.11  2.03  ~  3/2 median  n.a.  24.3  22.7 
D5:D1  1.83  1.96  1.96  :::; 2/3 median  19.6*  23.9  22.7 
*)  1994, **) 1995 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook1996 and updated database. 
Unfortunately, looking back to the recent decades the national microdata did not allow to 
study the evolution of the hours measure over the same years for all  five countries. For 
France (1985/1990) and the UK (1992) the effects were comparable to  those of 1996, 
while  the  United States  (1979/1985/1989), Germany  (1985/1991)  and  the Netherlands 
(1979/1985/1989) show different adjustments depending on the year. 
Turning to the incidence of low pay, the hours approach shows the French level (8.9 per 
cent)  significantly  below  that  of the  OECD  (13.3)  while  the  opposite  holds  for  the 
Netherlands (11.9 and 14.4 per cent respectively) and the UK (19.6 and 22.7). Chapter 2: Benchmarking and Inequality  9 
We can conclude that the effects of the hours approach on the picture of inequality are 
not uniform but depend on time and place which in tum refers to the incidence and pay of 
part-time work and the length of the working week. The outcomes confirm the view that 
overall wage inequality is much higher in  the United States than in Continental Europe. 
The  UK still  finds  itself in  an  intermediate  position,  but definitely closer now  to  the 
American pattern than to the Continental. The ninth-to-first-decile ratios are much higher 
in  the  two  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  four  or more  against  less  than  three  for  France, 
Germany and the Netherlands. Similar differences apply in the incidence of low pay. This 
is around 25 per cent for the USA and the UK on the one hand against about 10 per cent 
for France and Germany on the other, with the Netherlands in between at 15. 
2.3  The employment gap 
The national employment-to-population ratio is much higher for the United States than 
for France, Germany or the Netherlands, again  with the UK somewhere in  the middle. 
These  ratios  define  the  transatlantic  'employment  gap'.  This  is  due  to  both  higher 
participation rates  and longer average working hours for the  USA  as  we  have seen in 
Table 2.1. 
Broken down by levels of pay, the employment gap can be seen to be located at either 
end of the  earnings  distribution  (see  Table  2.3,  Panel  A).  Employment-to-population 
ratios in the USA are substantially higher not only for low pay but also for high pay, and 
strikingly  the  two  gaps  appear to  be  roughly  equal  to  each  other.  Consequently,  the 
employment gap cannot simply be identified as a deficiency of low-wage employment in 
Europe.  The  same  two-tailed  pattern  applies  to  the  UK but  here  the  gaps  are  much 
smaller than for the Continental economies. For France and Germany, the employment 
shortfall in  the tails is partly offset by  higher employment ratios  than the USA in  the 
middle range of earnings (between two-thirds and 150 per cent of the median wage). For 
the  Netherlands  and  the  UK,  however,  the  employment  ratio  in  the  middle  range  is 
comparable to  the  USA.  The European  advantage in  the  middle range is  considerably 
larger for head count employment but a significant part of this disappears when hours 
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Table 2.3  The emplovment gap bv level ofpav, 1996 (full-time equivalents) 
United States  France  Germany  Netherlands  United Kingdom 
Employment-to-Population ratio (  15-64) 
/gap to USA  in brackets) 
V1.  All 
Total (FTE)  82.0  63.9  (18.1)  65.6  (16.4)  59.3  (22.7)  71.9  (10.1) 
~  2/3 median  20.9  5.7  (15.2)  8.3  (12.6)  8.6  (12.3)  16.3  (  4.6) 
in between  40.1  47.4  (-7.3)  47.4  (-7.3)  41.4  (-1.3)  39.2  (  0.9) 
~  3/2 median  21.0  10.8  (10.2)  9.9  (11.1)  9.3  (11.7)  16.4  (  4.6) 
~.Men 
Total (head)  37.6  33.1  (4.5)  36.8  (0.8)  39.6  (-2.0)  34.1  (3.5) 
Total (FTE)  45.5  37.8  (7.7)  39.3  (6.2)  39.8  (5.7)  41.6  (3.9) 
~  2/3 median  9.4  2.6  (6.8)  2.9  (6.5)  4.0  (5.4)  6.7  (2.7) 
in between  21.7  27.9  (-6.2)  28.3  (-6.6)  27.7  (-6.0)  23.5  (  -1.8) 
~  3/2 median  14.4  7.4  (7.0)  8.1  (6.3)  8.1  (6.3)  11.3  (3.1) 
C. Women 
Total (head)  36.2  26.4  (9.8)  27.5  (8.7)  26.7  (9.5)  34.8  (1.4) 
Total (FTE)  36.5  26.0  (10.5)  26.3  (10.2)  19.5  (17.0)  30.3  (6.2) 
:$; 2/3 median  11.5  3.1  (8.4)  5.4  (6.1)  4.5  (7.0)  9.9  (1.7) 
in between  18.4  19.5  (-1.1)  19.1  (-0.7)  13.7  (4.7)  15.7  (2.7) 
~  3/2 median  6.6  3.4  (3.2)  1.8  (4.8)  1.3  (5.3)  5.0  (1.6) 
Panels B and C analyse the gap differentiated by gender. For men the difference in  the 
participation rate does not emerge as the prime cause of the employment gap, although it 
is  of some  importance  for  France  and  the  UK.  The  Dutch  rate  even  exceeds  the 
American.  The main  source  is  the  diverging length  of the  working  week,  due  to  the 
substantially longer hours worked by American men. Focusing on the low and high pay 
ranges, the male employment disadvantage in the Continental economies is about equal 
between low pay and high pay, and of similar size to their advantage in the middle range 
of pay. However, since the incidence of low pay in the United States is three to four times 
larger than in Europe the implied employment gap in low pay is relatively greater. For the 
UK likewise the employment gaps at the tails are equally sized but are only half as large 
as  for France, Germany and the Netherlands while the advantage in  the  middle is also 
rather small. 
By contrast, for women there is  a very large employment gap between the Continental 
countries on the one hand and the USA and the UK on the other. Although the low pay 
gap is substantial - to the USA as well as the UK- it is also clear that very few women in 
Germany and the Netherlands are high paid. In the United States the share of women in 
the highest bracket is four to five times as large as in these two countries. Chapter 2: Benchmarking and Inequality  11 
Table 2.4  Employment-to-population ratios by gender and segment of  pay,  1979-1996 
Per cent of  full population aged 15-64 
1979  1985  1989*  1996 
Men 
United States 
~  2/3 median  6.4  8.3  8.8  9.4 
in between  24.8  20.9  22.1  21.7 
~  3/2 median  14.3  14.5  14.8  14.4 
France 
~  2/3 median  3.2  3.1  2.6 
in between  30.3  29.3  27.9 
~  3/2 median  8.7  8.3  7.4 
Germany 
~  2/3 median  2.4  2.2  1.8 
in between  34.1  30.4  29.8 
~  3/2 median  7.7  8.8  8.5 
Netherlands 
~  2/3 median  3.2  1.9  2.8  4.0 
in between  36.6  28.6  31.1  27.7 
~  3/2 median  7.1  6.4  7.6  8.1 
United Kingdom 
~  2/3 median  5.7  6.7 
in between  25.2  23.5 
~  3/2 median  12.3  11.3 
Women 
United States 
~  2/3 median  10.4  10.9  11.1  11.5 
in between  16.9  16.9  18.5  18.4 
~  3/2 median  2.1  3.8  5.2  6.6 
France 
~  2/3 median  3.3  3.4  3.1 
in between  17.8  19.1  19.5 
~  3/2 median  2.4  3.0  3.4 
Germany 
~  213 median  5.2  5.2  4.4 
in between  16.8  17.5  18.4 
~  3/2 median  1.0  1.7  1.7 
Netherlands 
~  2/3 median  2.7  2.6  3.8  4.5 
in between  5.1  11.1  12.6  13.7 
~  3/2 median  0.4  0.4  0.7  1.3 
United Kingdom 
~  2/3 median  9.1  9.6 
in between  16.7  15.7 
~  3/2 median  4.5  5.0 
*) 1990 for France, 1991 for Germany and 1992 for the UK 
Table 2.4 shows how the gaps in employment-to-population ratios have moved over time. 
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a  slight  increase  for  American  women.  The  European  disadvantage  in  low-wage 
employment has  remained relatively constant for both men  and women.  In  the middle 
range of pay the European economies have lost a substantial part of their employment 
advantage  for  men  while  women  have  moved  closer to  the  American  level  with  the 
exception of the  UK.  The high-pay employment ratio for  American  men has,  perhaps 
surprisingly,  remained stable.  The European  experience in  high-wage  employment for 
men is diverse, with the employment gap widening in France and the UK but narrowing 
in  Germany and the Netherlands. The position on high-wage employment for women is 
the  most striking.  In  the  United States the  high-pay female employment ratio has risen 
rapidly, tripling from 2.1  to 6.6 between 1979 and 1996. On balance almost two thirds of 
the  growth  in  female  employment  in  the  United  States  occurred  in  high-wage 
employment. Although high-wage employment for women has also been growing in the 
European economies, albeit from a low base, European women are increasingly lagging 
behind their American sisters. 
Summarizing we can say that since  1979 the American employment-to-population ratio 
has  grown  by  seven  percentage  points,  entirely  due  to  the  increased  employment  of 
women.  No less than two-thirds of this female  growth  was  in  high-wage employment. 
The  employment  ratio  for  American  men  by  contrast  has  seen  no  growth,  a  three 
percentage points decline in  the  middle range being offset by an  equal  increase in  the 
low-paid tail.  In  the European economies the growth of female employment has barely 
balanced the decline for men, except in the Netherlands, and has been concentrated in the 
lower earnings ranges, with a growing employment gap emerging in high pay. 
The above analysis has been carried out for the full economy and, unfortunately, does not 
allow us to distinguish between the effects of weekly hours and participation rates within 
each of the three pay brackets. This should be an important topic for future research. 
2.4  Groups at risk 
Unsurprisingly,  the  incidence  of  both  low  pay  and  high  pay  based  on  different 
characteristics,  such  as  gender,  working week,  age,  industry,  education,  seniority,  and 
ethnicity,  is  also  substantially  higher in  the  USA.  However,  the  estimated  incidence 
shows significant variation with the measure used to determine low or high pay. Wages Chapter 2:  Benchmarking and Inequality  13 
below  two-thirds  or above  150  per cent of the  median  wage  each  involve  about  one 
quarter of American and British employment and,  roughly speaking, only one-tenth of 
European  employment  for  low  pay  and  one-sixth  for  high  pay.  Consequently,  the 
application of these median-based measures implies a comparison of very different slices 
of the population. By contrast, proportions across the Atlantic are often much closer, and 
sometimes even reversed, when a quartile or deciles basis is used. Naturally, the quartiles 
and deciles correspond to different levels of pay relative to the median wage. 
With that caveat, we now look at the categories at risk of low or high pay. We will view 
these within the individual countries, using the median-related measures, and taking as 
given  the  international  differences  in  the  incidence.  These  chances  will  be  indicated 
through concentration ratios which measure the frequency with which a group is found on 
low or high pay in comparison to the national average of low or high pay incidence; for 
example, with a ratio of 200 a category's incidence of pay is twice the national average. 
Contrary to what was said above about the incidence, it generally appears to make very 
little  difference  for  these  concentration  ratios  whether  the  deciles  or  quartiles  are 
considered or, alternatively, the median-related measures. Consequently, the latter present 
a rather reliable picture of the entire tail of the distribution. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 list all the 
groups- from a set of 40 categories present across all datasets -involved in low and high 
pay respectively, ranked by concentration ratio and grouped in five bands (100-150; 151-
200; 20 1-250; 251-300, and more than 300). The figures in brackets express the incidence 
of low  or high  pay as  a percentage of the  specific  category.  An  asterisk indicates  the 
categories in  other countries  with  an  incidence equal  to  the  American  level  or above. 
Naturally there are many overlaps between categories e.g. between educational levels and 
industry, employment type and occupation. 
3 The index is calculated as M=(l-average proportion remaining in same decile)/0.9. If  there is no mobility 
the value ofM is zero (see A. Shorrocks, The measurement of income mobility, Econometrica, 1978). 14 
0 
0 
c;t 
European-American Employment Gap 
part-time women 
188 Chapter 2: Benchmarking and Inequality 
0 
0 
~ 
15 
. . . .  . . . '  ~ 
other services 
aged 25-39 years 16  European-American Employment Gap 
The groups with a high risk of low pay are strikingly similar across all  five economies 
(the groups mentioned in the fully coloured-in cells occur in all five countries): 
Category  Share in national employment (%) 
• young workers  4-15 
• the low educated  8-45 
• the hotels and catering industry  1- 6 
• the retail industry  7-11 
• agriculture  1- 2 
• the other services  3- 8 
• manual workers  5- 9 
• shop and services workers  7-17 
• men with part-time jobs  1- 6 
• women with part-time jobs  8-15 
• women with full-time jobs  18-38 
• workers with a low seniority  19-42 
Strikingly,  all  four  European  countries  have  at  least  one  category  with  a  very  high 
incidence of low  pay (a concentration ratio  above  300,i.e. more  than  three  times the 
national average), while the United States has none. This means that for certain groups, in 
spite  of the  lower  overall  incidence  of low  pay  in  Europe,  the  absolute  chances  of 
receiving a low wage (indicated between brackets) can even exceed those of the USA 
(see asterisks). 
The  high-paid  categories,  in  contrast,  are  more  dispersed.  The  countries  have  eight 
categories in common: 
Category 
• managers 
• professionals 
• the high educated 
• financial services 
• utilities 
• prime-age employees aged 40 to 54 
• the educational sector 
• full-time men 
National employment shares(%) 
1-14 
2-17 
21-36 
4- 5 
1 
34-41 
5- 9 
53-61 
Often  other  categories join  the  above.  For example,  part-time  men  in  the  European 
countries are found importantly in both low and high pay, and are placed rather high up Chapter 2: Benchmarking and Inequality  17 
the earnings ladder in France and Germany. Again, the United States has no  categories 
with  very high  scores  (>300), while France and Germany do.  Nor does the USA even 
have  high  scores  (250-300),  while  all  European  countries  do.  The  role  of personal 
characteristics in explaining extreme levels of pay seems to be greater for high pay than 
for low pay, and also greater for Europe compared to the United States. The American 
categories with high pay are numerous but they are mostly found at relatively low levels 
of concentration. Quite frequently,  categories in Europe attain higher rates of high-pay 
incidence than the American equivalents do. 
On  both sides, that is  low as  well  as  high pay, these patterns appear to be rather stable 
over time. 
2.5  Gender and working time 
The position of American  women  with  a full-time job in  the  distribution  of earnings 
relatively favourable.  Their concentration ratio is below European levels, esp.  those of 
Germany and the Netherlands. Also, the distance to male full-time concentration levels is 
relatively small for these American women. In  comparison to other European countries 
the position of women compared to men is better in France. In  all  countries people on 
part-time jobs are found in low-wage employment, women as well  as men. However, at 
the  same  time  men  with  part-time jobs in  Europe  are  also  relatively  often  high  paid, 
particularly in  France and Germany,  as  are  French women  with  part-time jobs. In  the 
USA this  is  not the  case and hardly  any part-time workers  are found to  be  high paid. 
Sixty per cent of American part-time workers are low paid against 20 tot 40 per cent in 
Europe. Part-time employees make up 3.5  per cent of all  high-paid employment in  the 
United States while in  Europe the proportion varies between 9 and 14 per cent. It is an 
interesting question for further research  whether the  strong concentration of American 
part-time employees at the low end of the pay distribution  can help to explain the better 
position of American female full-timers. 
2.6  Industry 
The same four low-paying industries (hotels  and catering, retailing, other services and 
agriculture) are prominent in all countries and comprise a substantial part of employment, 18  European-American Employment Gap 
ranging from  14 to  23  per cent. The British share of employment in the American-type 
low-paying industries is as large as the American (Table 2.7). Other countries have less, 
but by their own standards of pay they have more except France. Interestingly, all  low-
paying industries in the United States and France pay particularly low wages, while in the 
other countries various other industries are also low paying but closer to the average. 
Table 2.7  Employment shares(%) segmented by three levels of  pay,  1996 
and concentration ratios of  industries within brackets 
USA  segmentation  National segmentation 
outspoken#  all  outspoken#  all 
United States 
low  22  (189)*  22  (189)*  22  (189)*  22  (189)* 
middle  71  (113)**  23  (95)**  71  (113)**  23  (95)** 
high  7  (159)**  55  (126)**  7  (159)**  55  (126)** 
France 
low  16  (226)*  16  (226)*  16  (226)*  16  (226)* 
middle  73  (112)**  16  (98)**  65  (89)**  64  (89)** 
high  11  (99)**  68  (113)**  19  (181)**  21  (176)** 
Germany 
low  14  (229)*  14  (229)*  25  (193)*  25  (193)* 
middle  71  (113)**  10  (49)**  63  (104)**  28  (71)** 
high  14  (90)**  75  (117)**  13  (182)**  46  (146)** 
Netherlands## 
low  14  (224)*  14  (224)*  27  (187)*  28  (184)* 
middle  77  (102)**  21  (71)**  53  (99)**  50  (99)** 
high  9  (171)**  65  (121)**  20  (148)**  22  (146)** 
United Kingdom 
low  23  (197)*  23  (197)*  22  (202)*  27  (186)* 
middle  63  (108)**  10  (80)**  47  (78)**  43  (79)** 
high  14  (158)**  67  (122)**  31  (174)**  31  (174)** 
#concentration ratios for low pay or high pay above 130. 
##Polarised industries (real estate/business services, and other services) were 50/50 divided between low 
and high pay. 
*concentration ratio for low pay;** ibidem for high pay 
The industry distribution of high pay, on  the other hand, shows a less universal pattern 
than  low  pay.  The  high-paying  sectors  common  to  the  five  countries  are  utilities, 
education and financial  services which  taken together represent a considerably smaller 
share  of employment  than  the  four  low-paying  industries.  In  addition  to  these  three 
industries, the USA counts six other high-paying industries in the table but most are close 
to  the  average,  that  is  they  have  a  concentration  ratio  not  far  above  100.  The  table 
underlines that the American industries paying particularly high wages are few:  mining, 
utilities and public administration. They comprise only seven per cent of employment and 
their share is larger in other countries, ranging from nine to seventeen per cent. Also, they Chapter 2:  Benchmarking and Inequality  19 
are  not  necessarily  high  paying  in  all  countries.  In  France  and  Germany  they  have 
concentration  ratios  at  or below  100.  Also  if we  compare  all  industries  that  are  high 
paying in the USA (55 per cent), we still find higher employment shares elsewhere (65 to 
75  per cent) and roughly comparable levels of concentration around  120.  If instead of 
sticking  to  the  American  characterisation  of industries  by  level  of pay  we  apply  the 
national  segmentation  to  each  country,  we  still  find  higher employment shares  in  the 
other countries, when limiting ourselves to very high  levels of concentration. It is only 
when we compare the economies fully on the basis of their national concentration ratios 
that the United States appears to attain a higher share of high-paying industries (55  %) 
than the other countries (21  - 46 %). In both cases the high-paying industries in Europe 
are at a further distance from  the average than  the United States. The industries in  the 
middle are slightly tilted towards high pay in  the United States and towards low pay in 
Europe. 
2. 7  Conclusions 
To summarise, this benchmarking study confirms the established picture of employment 
patterns  relative  to  the  earnings  distribution  but  the  study  also  adds  important  new 
insights. Focusing on hours worked the full economies could be compared and part-time 
employment could be  given  its  place  in  the  earnings  distribution.  It  appears  to  more 
strongly concentrated on low pay than in Europe. Explicitly addressing the question what 
is  happening on the high  pay side, impressive growth of American female employment 
was found, which the European economies are clearly failing to match. There is no doubt 
that the American has a much higher incidence of low pay than the Continental countries, 
but there has been relatively limited growth in this segment. The groups at risk of low pay 
emerge as quasi universal across the countries and occupying very similar positions in the 
national pay structure once the different levels of inequality have been taken into account. 
Low pay is identified more closely with certain industrial sectors than is high pay. Some 
groups are even more strongly situated at the margin of low pay in Europe than in the 
United States.  (Dutch  youths,  German and British  workers in  hotels  and catering, and 
British  manual  workers  and shop  workers).  High  pay  as  a concept is  more diffuse  in 
relation to industry. High-paying industries in  the USA may have a larger employment 
share and are not necessarily high paid; high-paying industries in Europe are fewer and 20  European-American Employment Gap 
pay an average wage more distinct from the average than in the United States. Finally, the 
study  shows  that  significant  differences  exist  between  the  European  countries, 
particularly the UK, although in some respects France and Germany also show strikingly 
close  resemblance.  The  essential  outcome is  that,  contrary  to  frequent  assertions,  the 
prime concern of European employment growth is not a lack of low-wage employment. Chapter 3 
Individual Dynamics of Low and High Pay: Patterns and Determinants 
of Earnings Mobility 
3.1  Introduction 
The previous sections of this report have concentrated on the extent and composition of 
low and high pay over time and between countries. This analysis was undertaken in terms 
of the  working population as  a whole,  disaggregated in  terms of the characteristics of 
workers and jobs. In  the present section the focus  moves to  earnings at the  individual 
level, with an emphasis on how individuals' pay changes over time. This is a dimension 
of central relevance to issues of social exclusion and policies towards alleviating poverty 
and promoting social integration. Where low pay is  a temporary state, involving young 
workers or those returning to employment after a period of unemployment or voluntary 
withdrawal  from  the  labour force,  the  welfare  implications  for  the  individual  and  the 
social consequences overall are clearly different, and arguably less severe, than when low 
pay is persistent. Allied to this is the issue of incidence; as long as low pay is a temporary 
state its incidence is likely to be widely distributed, with a relatively large proportion of 
the  working  population  experiencing it  at  some stage  in  their careers,  but for  limited 
periods only. Where it is a more permanent phenomenon, the disadvantaged groups are 
more concentrated and their cumulated losses greater. 
Mobility  at  the  individual  level  is  also  relevant  to  economic  efficiency.  Initial  job 
matches  may  be  less  than  optimal,  as  individuals'  attributes  in  employment  are 
imperfectly  known  to  new  employers  and  possibly  even  to  themselves.  As  work 
experience develops the  individual's human  capital, new  matches  become appropriate, 
either within the firm or involving a change of employer. Similarly, as market conditions 
and technology evolve, the mix of skills sought by firms among their employees will also 
evolve. The reallocation of the workforce across jobs in response to individuals' changing 22  European-American Employment Gap 
attributes  and  firms'  changing  requirements  is  an  essential  mechanism  in  promoting 
economic efficiency. 
A conventional wisdom maintains that the European economies are less  mobile (more 
'sclerotic')  than  the  USA,  that  is,  that  rigidities  within  the  wage  and  employment 
structures curtail rewards and blunt individual incentives. These rigidities are attributed, 
often quite loosely, to many sources: collective bargaining, wage regulation, pension and 
social support systems, employment protection, and others. These rigidities, expressed in 
part through lower earnings inequality, are seen as inhibiting mobility on the part of the 
individual and job expansion on the part of the employer. The European economies are 
compared unfavourably with the United States in these respects. 
Our purpose in this chapter is to examine earnings mobility at the individual level using a 
series of national microdatasets. The chapter is in two parts. Section 3.1  aims to give a 
broad comparative overview of a number of aspects  of earnings mobility,  specifically 
comparing the  four  European  economies  - France,  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and the 
United Kingdom- with the United States. As well as providing an overall perspective on 
individual  mobility,  this  overview  places  particular  emphasis  on  the  transitions  that 
enable  individuals  to  escape  from  low  wage  employment  and  move  up  the  earnings 
distribution. This analysis does not confirm a simple stereotype of a United States/Europe 
divide,  between  a mobile American  pattern  and an  immobile Europe.  Moreover,  only 
sometimes  does  it  confirm  an  Anglo-Saxon  I  Continental  split.  In  other respects  the 
divergences  between  the  European  economies  are  more  striking  than  the  similarities 
among them on the one hand, and differences against the United States on the other. 
The remainder of the chapter looks in  greater detail at key aspects of mobility, starting 
from  an  in-depth analysis of national experience where this is particularly insightful. (i) 
The first  aspect,  analysed in  Section 3.2, is  earnings change for individual  workers  as 
they  remain  within jobs or move  between  them.  The main  focus  in  this  analysis  the 
American experience, which can be put forward as the benchmark case. (ii) Much of the 
recent  analysis  of wage  inequality and shifts  in  employment structures  centres  on  the 
changing demand for  skills,  and  the  evidence,  mainly  from  the  USA,  of the  role  of 
changing skill differentials in wage inequality. Section 3.3 therefore gives a comparative Chapter 3: Earnings Mobility  23 
perspective  on  the  changing  skill  structure  of employment  and  the  pattern  of skill 
differentials  in  earnings  in  the  European  economies.  The  shift  to  skills  emerges  as 
universal, although skill structures and the wage premia to skills are surprisingly diverse 
across  the  European  economies.  Job  mobility  emerges  as  an  important  influence  on 
earnings growth for the individual, for the low-skilled as markedly as for the high-skilled. 
(iii) The largest single source of employment growth across the advanced economies over 
recent  decades  has  been  through  the  increasing  participation  of women  in  the  labour 
force, particularly in  part-time work. In  spite of this growth, lower female participation 
rates  remain  a  major source  of the  American-European jobs gap.  In  Section  3.4  Aan 
analysis of this for the UK, where the rate of part-time employment for women is high, 
indicates that part-time work carries a substantial pay penalty, not only during the work 
spell itself but also in terms of future earnings trajectories. Given the growing frequency 
of women's part-time  work  and of transitions  between  full-time  and  part-time  status, 
these implications are disturbing. (iv) A disproportionate share both of  job changes and of 
earnings mobility at the individual level occurs among young persons. The youth labour 
market in  France,  with  its  high  levels  of unemployment  and extensive  interventions, 
provides  a key  study on  this  aspect in  Section  3.5.  This highlights  the  importance of 
earnings  mobility  while  young  for  progression  out of low  pay,  and  also  offers  some 
disquieting evidence of declining returns  to  education  and experience among  younger 
cohorts. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2  A comparative overview of patterns of earnings mobility 
Where the earlier Chapter 2 examined how the stock of low and high paid workers differs 
between  countries  and  changes  over time,  attention  in  this  section  is  directed  to  the 
underlying flows of individuals (between two points in  time) moving up and down the 
earnings distribution. This requires panel data that enable individuals to be followed over 
time.  Given  the  relatively  limited  availability  of this  type  of data  for  long  periods, 
emphasis is placed on recent, more short term mobility i.e. movements over one, two and 
three year intervals during the 1990s. Where more extensive analysis has been possible it 
appears that,  while the extent of job changing varies  with  the cycle, there is  relatively 
little difference in patterns of mobility through the 1990s. The analysis therefore focuses 
on sub-periods within the 1990s or on changes between 1995 and 1996 as representative. 24  European-American Employment Gap 
We first examine transitions between low-paid employment, higher paid employment and 
other labour market  states  before  going  on  to  our main  topic,  examining  movements 
within  the  earnings  distribution.  We  then  consider  the  role  that  job-changing  or job 
mobility plays in bringing about earnings changes. 
Movements  by  individuals  between  different  states  (employment,  unemployment, 
inactivity) are a normal characteristic of the functioning of labour markets. They arise 
from  entries  and exits  due  to  normal  demographic  processes,  changing labour supply 
decisions,  the  economic  cycle,  and  the  birth  and  death  of firms,  and  feature  in  all 
economies. These transitions between states have important implications for the analysis 
of earnings mobility. Not all individuals employed at timet are still employed in the next 
period  (t+1),  and  similarly  not  all  workers  at  time  t+1  were  employed  at  time  t.  In 
analysing earnings mobility through comparison of earnings for two different periods it is 
important  to  bear  in  mind  that  earnings  changes  can  be  assessed  only  for  those  in 
employment in the reference periods used, and that those individuals entering from and 
exiting to non-employment (unemployment and inactivity) have to be excluded as  they 
do  not declare a wage in  each of the periods examined. As  a consequence the samples 
used for the analysis of earnings mobility represent only those in employment at each of 
the comparison dates, not the full working population. 
(a)  What happens to the low paidjro1n one year to the next? 
Before examining earnings  mobility more closely,  an  overall  picture of labour market 
transitions will  help to focus  attention on the situation of the low paid. The population 
covered here is aged between 20 and 60 in order to abstract from country differences in 
education systems and approaches to retirement. Table 3.1  shows quite high  transition 
rates  out  of low-paid employment  (here  defined  as  being  in  one  of the  lowest  three 
deciles of the earnings distribution). However in many cases the movement is often into 
unemployment or voluntary inactivity. Thus of those workers in the lowest three deciles 
of the earnings distribution in  1995, two thirds or fewer are still there a year later in each 
of the countries. About a fifth  have moved up the earnings distribution and 10 per cent 
are unemployed. Therefore between  10  and  15  per cent of low-paid workers are not in 
employment  one  year  later.  The  Netherlands  is  an  exception  since  there  are  fewer 
transitions  into  unemployment  and  generally  more  movement  up  the  earnings Chapter 3: Earnings Mobility  25 
distribution. The Netherlands and the UK stand out as  having greater movements from 
low pay into inactivity (9%  and  14%, respectively) and this may be related to the high 
proportions  of low-paid,  female  part-time  workers  in  these  countries.  For higher paid 
workers, 85 to 90 per cent remain in the top seven deciles, with only five per cent falling 
back into the  lowest three  deciles.  Only five  per cent move out of employment in  the 
United States, France and Germany compared with eight per cent for the UK and the 
Netherlands. 
Table 3.1  Destinations of  those in lowest 30% (highest 70%) of  the earnings distribution in  1995 
in following year 
Situation in 1996  United States  France  Germany  Netherlands  United Kingdom 
Lowest 30% of  64.8  66.8  65.3  61.0  60.9 
earnings  (5.9)  (5.0)  (5.1)  (5.0)  (5.1) 
Upper 70%of  19.7  19.4  18.8  27.0  19.5 
earnings  (87.6)  (89.5)  (88.7)  (85.0)  (84.5) 
Unemployed  8.9  8.9  2.0  4.3 
}  14.5  (2.4)  (2.6)  (2.0)  (1.4) 
Inactive  }  (5.3)  4.2  5.6  9.0  14.4 
(2.2)  (2.5)  (6.0)  (7.6) 
Self-employed  1.0  0.6  1.5  1.0  1.2 
(1.1)  (0.7)  (0.9)  (2.0)  (1.4) 
Table 3.2  Destinations of  the unemployed (inactive) in 1995 in following year 
Situation in 1996  United States  France  Germany  Netherlands  United Kingdom 
Lowest 30% of  13.7  18.1  19.5  9.0  13.4 
earnings  (4.4)  (18.5)  (2.0)  (4.9) 
Upper 70% of  7.7  9.4  8.7  4.0  12.5 
earnings  (1.8)  (4.1)  (1.0)  (5.0) 
Unemployed  58.3  42.0  48.0  41.9 
}  75.4 
(4.6)  (4.4)  (6.0)  (3.6) 
Inactive  12.5  26.5  39.0  26.3 
(89.0)  (72.3)  (91.0)  (84.9) 
Self  -employed  2.9  1.7  3.4  0.0  5.9 
(0.3)  (0.7)  (0.0)  (1.5) 
Transitions  for  those  already  in  employment  are  not  too  dissimilar  across  countries. 
However when looking at what happens to the unemployed and inactive a year later some 
interesting differences emerge (Table 3.2). Firstly, of those unemployed in  1995, around 
70 per cent are still  unemployed or have withdrawn from  the labour force altogether a 
year later in France, Germany and the UK. The figure for the Netherlands however is 87 
per cent, and for the USA it is not possible to distinguish inactivity from unemployment. 
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have moved back into employment by  1996. Interestingly in France and Germany, two 
thirds of those finding work are in  low-paid jobs, compared to  the UK where the split 
between high and low-paid jobs is more balanced. For the USA, a quarter of those not 
employed in  1994 have found  work a year later, the majority moving into low-paying 
jobs.  For the  Netherlands,  however,  only  14%  of the  unemployed  move  back  into 
employment, three quarters of them into low-paid employment. Almost all of those who 
are out of the labour force in 1995 are still so in  1996 in all countries (85 to 90%) except 
for Germany (72%) where more than 20 per cent move into employment (low paid in the 
main). 
(b)  To  what extent is earnings mobility upwards? 
Earnings  mobility  is  examined  using  movements  in  an  individual's  position  in  the 
earnings distribution from one year to the next. Thus the analysis in the remainder of this 
section is restricted to persons in employment in both 1995 and 1996. Table 3.3 contains 
details of movements between deciles of the earnings distribution for each country. The 
earnings distribution for all  workers is  used to establish the  level of decile earnings in 
each year, and thus the earnings of those in work and present in the panel sample in both 
years are only a subset of those present in the earnings distribution. A number of points 
relating  to  the  use  of decile  transition  matrices  as  a  method  for  analysing  earnings 
mobility are worth mentioning. Firstly, as  an  individual's decile position is used as  the 
reference,  we  are  concerned here  with  relative  earnings mobility (changes  in  absolute 
earnings levels are considered below in section 3.A) and therefore moving down need not 
mean a reduction in real hourly earnings. Secondly, having chosen decile earnings levels 
as cut-offs, a movement between deciles may involve only a small change in earnings, as 
for example when someone on  the 59th percentile wage moves up to the 60th percentile 
in the following year. Thirdly, mobility based on movements between deciles will be less 
prevalent  where  the  earnings  distribution  is  more  unequal,  as  the  earnings  increase 
required to move between percentiles is greater. Finally, due to measurement error and 
rounding by respondents in  the surveys, there may be spurious rather than real mobility 
into the adjacent deciles. 
It  is clear from the tables that, measured in  this way,  patterns of earnings mobility are 
similar across countries in three respects. First, around 40 to  50 per cent remain in  the Chapter 3: Earnings Mobility 
Table 3.3  Earmngs Decile movements- United States 1994-9'i 
Earnings Decile 1994  Position in 1995 
United States 
Lowest 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Seventh 
Eighth 
Ninth 
Highest 
France 1995-6 
Lowest 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Seventh 
Eighth 
Ninth 
Highest 
Germany 
Lowest 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Seventh 
Eighth 
Ninth 
Highest 
Netherlands 1995-6 
Lowest 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Seventh 
Eighth 
Ninth 
Highest 
United Kingdom 1995-6 
Lowest 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Seventh 
Eighth 
Ninth 
Highest 
Next decile down  Same decile 
16.9 
8.7 
15.6 
14.8 
16.5 
17.8 
18.3 
16.4 
14.6 
15.9 
17.0 
13.4 
13.6 
14.8 
14.9 
15.3 
16.8 
16.7 
6.7 
6.6 
9.9 
13 
12.3 
17.7 
20.5 
16.5 
11.7 
4 
14 
15 
18 
21 
21 
19 
19 
12 
17.6 
17.2 
15.6 
13.7 
17.1 
12.8 
15.7 
17.1 
13.5 
57.6 
41.8 
48.9 
45.9 
46.5 
45.8 
47.9 
48.4 
57.6 
74.7 
59.8 
49.4 
41.0 
43.7 
45.4 
46.1 
47.5 
49.8 
59.6 
75.5 
59.0 
51.0 
41.5 
38.2 
36.8 
33.3 
39!3 
36.6 
54.4 
78.8 
36 
55 
49 
38 
39 
39 
40 
43 
50 
81 
49.8 
43.0 
41.1 
41.2 
37.5 
40.0 
40.0 
44.8 
54.6 
75.1 
Next decile up 
19.0 
21.4 
19.6 
15.9 
16.0 
16.0 
15.2 
15.5 
15.7 
22.5 
20.8 
22.7 
21.0 
21.4 
21.4 
21.3 
21.0 
15.7 
24.9 
26.7 
28.8 
28.1 
27.4 
27.6 
24.6 
23.0 
23.0 
20 
23 
25 
24 
21 
18 
21 
20 
24.1 
23.8 
20.5 
18.1 
23.8 
22.0 
22.7 
25.0 
16.8 
Higher decile 
23.4 
19.9 
17.3 
15.3 
14.3 
11.3 
8.7 
5.9 
17.7 
13.9 
14.2 
14.2 
11.0 
8.8 
6.9 
4.2 
16.1 
15.6 
22.4 
19.7 
15.7 
13.3 
10.5 
5.1 
25 
21 
14 
17 
14 
9 
9 
5 
26.1 
15.6 
13.6 
16.5 
13.1 
11.0 
10.4 
4.4 
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same earnings decile between the two years, although there is rather more movement in 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK compared to France and the USA. Secondly, the 
proportion moving upwards declines with higher initial decile positions, suggesting that 
the probability of upward movement is higher for those in the lower half of the earnings 
distribution. Thirdly, between  10  and 20 per cent move down a decile between the two 
years and the figures are very similar for the different countries. Overall, no movement 
between deciles is the most common case across the earnings distribution. Where there is 
movement across deciles, it is more frequently upward than downward. The Netherlands 
stands out among the countries as  having more movement away from the initial decile 
position. However, on the basis of Shorrocks' index of mobility
3 the countries are ranked 
as follows: there is a higher degree of mobility in the Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK (M=0.59) compared to the USA and France (M=0.54). 
One  of the  main  issues  addressed in  this  project is  the  role  and consequences of job 
changing. Separations can be voluntary- in order to achieve better earnings and working 
conditions - or involuntary - as a result of downsizing or dismissal. In  the former case, 
earnings are expected to be higher but in the case of an involuntary separation they may 
subsequently be lower. The rate of job mobility declines with age but the rate of decline 
is different among countries. The majority of job changers within any given country are 
under 30 (see Subsection (d) below), and the role of earnings and job mobility for young 
persons  is  examined  later  in  Section  3.5.  For  the  moment,  the  relationship  between 
earnings mobility and job-changing is described for the working population as a whole. 
(c)  Do job-changers leave low-paying jobs? 
Voluntary separations occur in the main when workers feel that the pay and conditions of 
their current job are inferior to what they can obtain elsewhere. Involuntary separations 
due to lay-offs often affect the lower paid as  was mentioned above. Thus it is expected 
that job-changers will  more often, though  not exclusively, be leaving jobs in  the lower 
half of the earnings distribution. Table 3.4 presents the previous earnings of  job-changers. 
In all countries most job-changers leave jobs in the lower half of the earnings distribution 
-around 60 per cent have earnings below the median of the overall distribution of hourly 
earnings. However, in the USA and the UK more than a third are low paid (with previous 
earnings of less than  two-thirds of the median) compared to a fifth  or less in  the three Chapter 3: Earnings Mobility  29 
continental  European  countries  where  two  thirds  and  three  quarters  leave jobs in  the 
middle of the distribution (67% to  160% of median earnings). The proportions changing 
job with earnings greater than 160 per cent of the median are similar (around 12%) in all 
countries except the Netherlands (  4%  ). Thus the main conclusion drawn here is that job-
changing is far more concentrated among the low paid in the USA and the UK compared 
to France, Germany and the Netherlands where it is  more prevalent among those in  the 
middle of the earnings distribution. This reinforces the conclusion of the benchmarking 
section of the report, that the main difference between the countries is that the centre of 
the distribution is fatter in continental Europe compared to the USA and the UK where 
the tails of the earnings distribution weigh more heavily. 
Table 3.4 Previous earnings of  those changing emplover in last 12 months (  1995-96) 
United States  France  Germany  Netherlands  United Kingdom 
Less than two thirds of 
median earnings  39.7  21.1  14.4  20.1  36.9 
Between two thirds and 
1. 6 times median 
earnings  48.1  68.1  72.4  76.1  49.7 
Greater than 1.6 times 
median earnings  12.2  10.3  13.0  3.8  13.4 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
Table 3.5  Current ean1ings of  those changing employer in last 12 months 1995-96 
United States France  Germany  Netherlands  United Kingdom 
Less than two thirds of 
median earnings  34.8  19.4  10.9  33.6  32.8 
Between two thirds and 
1.6 times median 
earnings  51.6  66.9  80.2  58.5  55.5 
Greater than 1.6 times 
median earnings  13.6  13.7  7.9  7.9  12.7 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
(d)  Do job-changers enter higher-paying jobs? 
The earnings distribution of the destinations of job-changers is a slightly distorted mirror 
image of the distribution of previous earnings for the France and the United States (see 
Table 3.5).  All  countries  have  fewer job changers  who  are  low  paid with  their  new 
employer except for the Netherlands. In Germany and France the majority end up in jobs 
in  the middle of the earnings distribution while in  the USA, UK and the Netherlands, a 
third  of job changers  find  themselves  in  the  lower  tail  of the  earnings  distribution. 
However, there is a divergence between Germany and the Netherlands on the one hand 30  European-American Employment Gap 
and the USA, UK and France on  the other, in  the  upper tail  (greater than  160% of the 
median). The latter three countries have higher proportions of higher-paying jobs. When 
compared to the distribution of earnings of those leaving jobs, it is likely that job changes 
overall tend to reduce earnings inequality from below except in the Netherlands. 
(e)  Conclusions 
This review provides little support for the view that earnings mobility in the United States 
is systematically greater than in the European economies. The first summary finding from 
this analysis is that overall mobility, including as summarised by the Shorrocks index, is 
greater  in  the  European  economies  (with  the  exception  of France).  A  number  of 
similarities across countries emerge in  terms of movements of the low and higher paid 
from  one  year to  the  next.  There is  significant movement out of low  pay  and up  the 
earnings distribution in general. However, there are  workers whose relative position in 
the earnings distribution declines,  as  well  as  a non-negligible proportion  moving from 
low  pay into non-employment.  Yet divergences  arise  in  terms of movements between 
jobs. In the USA, the UK and the Netherlands, a third of workers who change employers 
move into low-paying jobs, whereas in France and Germany the majority remain in the 
jobs with  pay in  the  middle of the  earnings distribution.  The relationship between job 
mobility  and  earnings  changes  is  examined  more  closely  in  the  next  section.  Other 
divergent findings  relate to  cross-country differences in  the  composition  of the  labour 
force and employment by skill group, sex and age, which feature in the subsequent parts 
of this chapter. 
3.3  The consequences of changing jobs for earnings mobility 
One important way in  which earnings mobility can occur is through changing employer. 
Earnings can rise or fall as a consequence of changing employer depending on the nature 
of the job separation. Individuals initially often accept a job that requires fewer skills than 
they possess or pays lower wages than their education warrants, and seek to redress this 
discrepancy by finding a more suitable position with another employer. However, when 
the job change is involuntary where firms lay off workers, the next job accepted by the 
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an in-depth analysis of the impact of job-changing on individual earnings growth for the 
United States. 
The study uses panel data for the period 1986-93. Three types of worker are distinguished 
in this analysis of earnings growth: 
• workers remaining with the same employer, 
• workers moving from one employer to another without an intervening break, and 
• workers moving with an intervening period of non-employment (unemployment or 
being out of the labour force). 
The reference group is workers staying with the same employer who presumably feel that 
remaining is the most beneficial option open to them and any earnings growth will arise 
from internal promotion, length of service-based pay policies or collective agreements in 
which seniority premia are set. However, there is no guarantee that earnings will increase 
on an annual basis either in real or nominal terms. In fact the study reveals a high degree 
of heterogeneity in real wage growth in the United States. 
(a)  Within-job wage variation 
In  the  period in  question,  the average annual  growth  rate of real  hourly earnings (the 
growth of nominal  earnings less the  rate of consumer price inflation) of workers  who 
remained with same employer for more than a year was 2.1 per cent for males and 3.2 per 
cent for females. However, the median rate of growth of earnings for workers remaining 
with the same employer was negative, indicating that more than half of all such workers 
experienced real wage reductions. This is partly due to the frequency at which wages are 
negotiated but also due to  product and labour market influences. For example, workers 
with higher levels of education, or more than one year's seniority, or who were white or 
non-Hispanic, all had a greater probability of positive real wage growth. In addition, the 
probability of positive real-wage growth is higher in the 1990s. 
(b)  Between-job wage changes 
Workers who changed employer and moved directly from one job to another on average 
experienced positive real-wage increases. For male workers, the average annual increases 
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is a consequence of searching for a better worker-job match. For female workers, the rate 
of real-wage increase (3.7%) is similar to that for "stayers". The median growth rate in 
each case is positive, although around 48 per cent of workers changing job experience a 
reduction in real earnings. 
One  of the  most interesting findings  is  that workers  changing jobs but experiencing a 
spell of non-employment in between jobs undergo reductions in real earnings on average 
of 2.5 per cent for males and 2.9 per cent for females. These figures are reinforced by the 
observation that more than 55 per cent of workers in this group experience real-earnings 
reductions.  Such  reductions  are  more  common  among  those  workers  who  have  short 
tenures in past jobs and those who change from full-time to part-time work. 
These findings reveal the importance of analysing individual  wage changes rather than 
the  change  in  the  average  earnings  of a  group  of workers.  There  is  a  great  deal  of 
movement within a group and the overall average disguises the heterogeneity that exists 
in earnings changes from one year to the next. These results for the United States have to 
be seen in a context in which earnings inequality increased but average earnings growth 
was  slow  and often negative in  real  terms.  That around half of all  workers experience 
real-wage  reductions  on  a  year-on-year  basis  - whether  they  stayed  with  the  same 
employer or changed jobs - is a striking finding. 
(c)  Real wage variations in Europe 
Movements in relative positions in the earnings distribution were examined in the earlier 
part of the report in terms of deciles. However, in view of the finding of widespread real 
wage reductions in the United States it is interesting to know whether such heterogeneity 
in  wage growth is also found in Europe. Figures for France for real hourly earnings (net 
of social  security  contributions)  are  presented in  Table  3.6.  A  number of individuals 
report  large increases  in  hourly earnings  generally associated with  large  reductions  in 
hours of work. Since the mean is artificially inflated by extreme values, the more reliable 
median real-wage growth figure  is  presented along with  the proportion experiencing a 
reduction in real wages from one year to the next. While the median figures always show 
positive real wage growth, the ranking by job situation is the same as that in the United 
States.  Those individuals experiencing job-to-job changes  with  no intervening spell  of 
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employer experience very weak growth and those changing employer with an intervening 
spell  of unemployment  or  inactivity  have  even  less.  However,  quite  strikingly,  the 
proportions experiencing real wage reductions are quite comparable to those in the USA. 
In a country like France, where collective agreements cover almost all workers, it is very 
striking that some 48 per cent of workers with the same employer experience real-wage 
reductions. While some of this may be due to changes in social security contribution rates 
and other deductions from pay, and some may be spurious due to mis-reporting and other 
forms of measurement error, the figure is still significant. 
Table 3.6  Real waf?e grmvth in France 1990-97 (percentages) 
Median  Proportion with negative real wage growth 
Males 
Same employer  0.35  48.3 
Job to job  2.8  43.9 
Intervening non-employment  0.03  49.9 
Females 
Same employer  0.6  46.9 
Job to job  2.3  44.9 
Intervening non-employment  0.2  49.1 
Table 3. 7 Real earninf?S f?rowth  in  Germany, 1995-96 (percentages) 
Median  Percentage experiencing a reduction 
All workers  4.7  35.1 
Same employer 
Job to job 
Intervening non-employment 
*  Figure based on a very small sample size 
Table 3.8  Real earnings growth in the United Kilzf?dom (percentages) 
34.5 
44.1 
18.0* 
Average increase (median)  Percentage experiencing a reduction 
1991-92 
All workers  5.15 (2.2)  40.8 
Same employer  4.6  41.3 
Change of  employer  6.4  35.7 
1995-96 
All workers  2.4  (1.7)  42.0 
Same employer  2.5  41.5 
Change of  employer  0.8  44.0 
For Germany,  the  median  rate of real-wage growth  was 4.7  per cent in  1995-96  (see 
Table 3.7). However, in common with the United States and France, over a third of all 
workers experienced real-wage reductions between the two  years.  The figure  is  higher 
(44%) for those changing employer between the two  years.  In the United Kingdom, a 34  European-American Employment Gap 
similar picture emerges (see Table 3.8). In  1991-92, while on the average increase in real 
hourly earnings was 5.2 per cent, over 40 per cent of workers experienced a decrease. In 
1995-96,  the  figures  were  2.5  per  cent  for  the  average  increase  while  42  per  cent 
experienced a  reduction  in  their real  hourly  earnings.  There  is  a  key  role  played  by 
cyclical variations in that workers who change employer do better than those who do not 
in  1991-92, and the opposite occurs in  1995-96. In  addition, in the Netherlands, there is 
evidence that around 70 per cent of workers experienced reductions in  real  net hourly 
earnings in the period 1992-5 and around 35 per cent in 1995-8. 
Thus, in  Europe as  well  as  in  the United States, there is  considerable heterogeneity in 
annual  wage  changes.  It is  difficult  uphold  the  hypothesis  that  downward  real  wage 
rigidity is  a key feature  of European labour markets.  On  the  contrary, in  view  of the 
substantial proportions of workers concerned, European labour markets would appear to 
exhibit as much downward wage flexibility as the American market. 
3.4  The skill-wage gap 
The  benchmarking  analysis  of low-wage  and  high-wage  employment  reported  above 
indicated  that  shortfalls  in  low-wage  and  high-wage jobs in  the  European  economies 
contributed approximately equally to the jobs deficit relative to the United States. In each 
of the countries studied the level of education features prominently in  the allocation of 
workers into these two groups. Workers with low levels of education have a risk of low 
pay at least 50 per cent greater than for the workforce as a whole, while highly educated 
workers are similarly concentrated in high-wage employment. 
Nekkers and De Grip use national micro-data to provide a more detailed analysis of the 
changing  skill-structure  of employment  in  the  1990s,  and  the  associated  changes  in 
earnings patterns.  As  in  the  benchmarking section  above,  they  differentiate  three  skill 
levels on the basis of the individual's highest level of educational attainment: low-skilled 
(ISCED 0-2); medium-skilled (ISCED 3); and high-skilled (ISCED 5-7; 6-7 only for the 
Netherlands; ISCED category 4 is typically not used). Chapter 3:  Earnings Mobility 
Graph 3.1  Employment shares(%) by educational level 
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(a)  Skill structures in the four European econonzies 
Their analysis for the four European economies confirms the broad picture of significant 
cross-country  differences  in  the  skills  structure  of  the  workforce  noted  in  the 
benchmarking section (which uses different data-sets and a full-time equivalent basis) -
see Graph 3.1. Nekkers and De Grip report workers with intermediate levels of skill as 
the largest group by a substantial margin in Germany, France and the Netherlands in line 
with the results from the benchmarking analysis (which further shows intermediate skills 
as  the modal group in the USA, see Table 62). However, Nekkers and De Grip find the 
concentration at the intermediate level to be particularly marked in Germany, at around 
70  per  cent  of  the  workforce,  against  some  50  per  cent  in  both  France  and  the 
Netherlands,  where  the  benchmarking  reports  a  significantly  higher  proportion  of 
intermediate skills in France, 68  per cent, similar to the German level. Nekkers and De 
Grip's  national  data  also  confirm  the  strikingly  different  position  in  the  UK,  their 
estimate of the low-skilled as the dominant category, with 44 per cent of the workforce in 
1998, being virtually identical to the figure from the benchmarking. This preponderance 
of low-skilled workers in the UK workforce contrasts with a low-skill proportion of only 
around 10 per cent in Germany, and 20 per cent in France and the Netherlands. On the 
other hand the UK workforce has much the largest proportion of workers classified as 
highly skilled, 41  per cent, against around 30 per cent in France and the Netherlands and 
only 20 per cent in Germany. (The benchmarking indicates that the high-skill proportion 
in  the  USA is  significantly  higher than  in  any  of the  European  economies.) The skill 
structure of the  workforce  thus  emerges  as  a further  area  where  the  UK  economy  is 
sharply differentiated, its polarization between high  and low  skills contrasting with  the 
three Continental European economies where the distribution of the workforce by level of 
education has its main concentration at the intermediate level. 
In  all  four  countries  the  shift  towards  skills  over  the  1990s  is  clear.  In  France,  the 
Netherlands and the UK this shift has taken the form of a sharp decline in the proportion 
of low-skill workers, from around 30 to 20 per cent in  France and the Netherlands, and 
from  55  to 44 per cent in  the  UK.  The counterpart increases have been mainly in  the 
share of the high-skill group, particularly in France and the UK, although the intermediate 
level has also shown some increase. The changes in skill structure have been less marked 
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while the proportion of high-skilled has risen by three to four per cent at the expense of 
intermediate skills. 
(b)  Skill structures and earnings 
Unsurprisingly, low, intermediate and high-skilled workers tend to be concentrated in the 
lower, medium and upper deciles of the earnings distribution respectively, although the 
correlation is by no means exact. In all four countries 40 to 55 per cent of the low-skilled 
are  in  the  bottom three  deciles  of the  wage  distribution,  and  the  same  proportion  of 
intermediate-skilled  workers  in  the  middle  deciles.  The  high-skilled  have  the  most 
marked concentration within the earnings distribution, with 50 to 65  per cent placed in 
the top three deciles in each country. The concentration of the low-skilled in the bottom 
deciles has tended to increase over the 1990s, confirming the deterioration in the labour 
market  position  of low-skill  workers  even  when  they  remain  in  employment.  This  is 
consistent with the fall in demand for low-skilled workers occurring at an even faster rate 
than the fall in their supply. Other evidence indicates that it may also reflect selection; as 
educational levels in  general rise, the remaining low-skill workers (minimum education 
only) are likely to be of lower ability than the previously larger group. The concentration 
of the high-skilled in the upper earnings deciles, on the other hand, has shown no clear 
tendency to increase (even, in  the case of France, tending to decline). This is consistent 
with the increase in the supply of skilled workers, pointed out above, essentially keeping 
pace with the growth in demand for their services. 
The rising level of skills within the workforce poses a problem for the analysis of changes 
in the earnings distribution. As  Nekkers and De Grip point out, if the skill level at, say, 
the 9th decile point rises, and with it the wage, while skill and the wage at the median 
remain unchanged, then an increase in the D9/D5 ratio will be observed. This can lead to 
the  implication  of  increased  upper-distribution  inequality,  although  the  substantive 
change that has  taken  place is  merely a return to  the  increased skill  of the  9th  decile 
worker.  The same effect is likely to  operate at  the  lower end of the  distribution,  with 
rising educational attainment among the low-skilled. They therefore approach the issue of 
the role of skill  in the earnings distribution by focusing on  skill-wage ratios, i.e.  wage 
relativities between the different skill categories, on the assumption that the level of skill 
within each category remains more or less stable. They find the wage return to high skill 38  European-American Employment Gap 
as  against  intermediate  skill  (high/medium  skill  wage  ratio,  wJ!wm)  to  be  greatest  in 
France, with a premium of 50 per cent or more, closely followed by the UK, and then 
Germany at around 40 per cent, while in  the Netherlands the pay of the high-skilled is 
only 20 per cent higher than for the intermediate-skilled (see Table 3.9). In the case of the 
UK the high-skill premium has been rising over the 1990s, while in Germany it shows no 
clear trend, and in France and the Netherlands it has been declining. The wage premium 
to  high  skill  is  greatest  in  non-commercial  services  (education,  health,  public 
administration). Since these are largely provided within the public sector, this indicates 
the role of the public sector in  employing and rewarding the highly educated.  Only in 
Germany,  and  to  some extent the Netherlands, do  workers  with  intermediate levels  of 
skill  have a significant pay advantage relative to the low-skilled (w,/wl). In France and 
the UK the average return is only 11  to 15 per cent, against 42 per cent for intermediate-
skill  workers  in  German  manufacturing.  These  skill  relativities  have  remained  fairly 
constant, although the relative wage position of the low-skilled in Germany and the UK 
appears  to  have deteriorated significantly in  the  later 1990s.  Overall, the inequality in 
earnings associated with differing wage returns to skill remains substantial in France and 
the UK, and least in the Netherlands. 
Table 3.9  Skill-wage ratios: the Netherlands, Germany, France and the UK,  1992,  1995 and 
1998 
1992  1995  1998 
wnlwt  wflwm  w,/w1  wflwm  w,/w1  wflwm 
France  1.06  1.62  1.16  1.55  1.11  1.50 
Germany  1.18  1.46  1.18  1.34  1.36*  1.40* 
Netherlands  1.18  1.25  1.16  1.27  1.22  1.20 
United Kingdom  1.26  1.42  1.20  1.44  1.15  1.47 
* 1997 
Differences in wage growth over the 1990s have in  general been less marked across skill 
groups than across sectors. Among the more striking developments in the earlier years of 
the  1990s are the strong earnings growth for all  skill groups in commercial services in 
France and the relatively weak growth of earnings in manufacturing in  the Netherlands, 
while over the second half of the period agricultural workers at all skill levels in Germany 
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(c)  Skills and  job nzobility 
Nekkers  and De  Grip provide a parallel  analysis to that of Gottschalk in  the  previous 
section by examining relative wage changes for job movers and stayers, differentiated by 
skill level; movers are further differentiated depending on whether the move keeps them 
within their previous sector, broadly defined as agriculture, industry, commercial or non-
commercial  services,  or involves  inter-sector mobility  (see  Table  3.10).  For the  low-
skilled mobility between  sectors  has  most commonly been  associated with  the  largest 
wage gains; even within-sector mobility brings greater returns than no job change. This is 
consistent with only low levels of job-specific skill being accumulated on  the job, and 
therefore lost with inter-sectoral job movement. 
Table 3.10  Wage changes by mobility category, France,  Gennany, Netherlands and UK,  1992-95 
and 1995-98 (%) 
1992-1995  1995-1998 
Wlt  Wmm  Whh  Wlt  Wmm  Whh 
France 
not mobile  12.9  18.2  6.2  3.9  5.7  5.9 
mobile within sectors  4.7  27.8  10.5  4.5  9.3  9.2 
mobile between sectors  5.2  6.3  23.8  5.5  3.5  6.7 
total  11.2  16.5  10.4  4.2  5.8  6.2 
Germany 
not mobile  8.1  7.2  6.2  5  3.3  2.5 
mobile within sectors  9  7.6  9.1  5.4  2.3  3.5 
mobile between sectors  6  6.1  8.8  10.4  4.7  8.2 
total  8.1  7.2  7.2  5.5  3.1  3.3 
Netherlands 
not mobile  6.1  2.6  4.4  6  8.9  5.7 
mobile within sectors  13.6  9.9  0.5  4.7  6.8  7.7 
mobile between sectors  21.1  3.3  0.2  9.7  6.5  11.6 
total  8.6  3.5  3.4  6.1  8.5  6.1 
United Kingdom 
not mobile  5  3.6  3  4.1  4.4  3.5 
mobile within sector  7.5  -4.8  3.2  5.6  6.9  5.9 
mobile between sectors  7.2  8  0.1  6.3  3.9  3 
total  5.8  2.4  2.6  4.6  5.1  3.8 
For those  with  low-skills  finding  a better job in  another sector is  the most rewarding 
strategy. For those with intermediate-level skills, on the other hand, wage increases tend 
to be largest when there has been job mobility within the sector. This is consistent with 
the  concept of skills at  the  intermediate level  being sector-specific  skills,  transferable 
between firms but less so between sectors. The most clear-cut returns to job mobility are 
for high skill workers; high-skill workers who change jobs are consistently more highly 40  European-American Employment Gap 
rewarded than stayers, with those who move across sectors achieving the greatest wage 
gains. These findings give strong evidence not only that there is a substantial volume of 
mobility at  the individual level in the European economies but that it responds to wage 
incentives  and  opportunities.  Collective  bargaining  and  other institutional  features  of 
wage-setting  in  Europe  provides  a  framework  in  which  individual  opportunities  for 
advancement through job mobility are extensively available and accepted. 
(d)  Conclusion 
The overall picture is thus one of a shift to  higher skill levels within the workforce in 
each country. The supply particularly of high-skilled workers in the European economies 
seems to have grown at least in line with the rising demand for skills, such that the wage 
differential for skills has tended to decline over the  1990s. The demand for low-skilled 
workers, on the other hand, has fallen more rapidly than their supply, which is reflected 
in a deterioration in their relative wage position. The wage structure, and the wage returns 
to skills, are by no means static. The use of micro-data reveals that, within these overall 
changes, much greater change has been taking place at the individual level. Job mobility, 
within  and  between  sectors,  at  all  skill  levels,  is  an  important  influence  on  earnings 
growth for the individual worker, no less for the low skilled than for other groups. 
3.5  Gender, part-time work and earnings mobility 
One  of the  main  findings  of the  benchmarking  study  is  that  a  significant  part  of the 
transatlantic  employment gap  arises  from  the  differential  rates  of employment among 
women. Across the four European economies women make only around 70 per cent of 
the  contribution  to  the  overall  employment/population  ratio  made  by  their  American 
counterparts.  This  deficiency  is  strongly  marked  in  full-time  work  (especially  in  the 
Netherlands)  and  is  offset  to  a  modest  degree  by  a  higher contribution  from  women 
working part-time (under 35 hours per week), particularly in the Netherlands and the UK, 
and to some extent Germany (Table 3.11). 
The jobs gap between Europe and the United States in full-time work amongst women is 
evident across the earnings distribution while the advantage of the European economies 
in  part-time jobs for women  is  concentrated at  the medium pay level  - Table 3.12.  A Chapter 3: Earnings Mobility  41 
striking  asymmetry  arises  in  part-time  opportunities  at  the  extremes  of the  earnings 
distribution. While the chances that women will  be in  high-paid part-time employment 
are uniformly low across all the countries studied, the likelihood that they will be in low-
paid part-time employment is significantly higher in the United States and even more so 
in the UK, than it is in France, Germany or the Netherlands. 
Table 3.11  Contribution of  women to the employment/population ratio ( FTE) 1996 
(percentage points) 
All women  Full-time work  Part-time work 
United States  36  31  5 
France  26  21  5 
Germany  25  18  7 
Netherlands  20  11  9 
United Kingdom  30  21  9 
Table 3.12  Contribution ofwomen to employment/population ratio (FTE) by pay levels 1996 
(  )  [percentage pm1zts 
Low pay  Medium pay  High pay 
Full-time  Part-time  Full-time  Part-time  Full-time  Part-time 
United States  8  3  17  2  6 
France  2  1  16  3  2 
Germany  3  2  14  4  1 
Netherlands  2  2  8  6  1 
United Kingdom  6  4  12  4  4 
Table 3.13  Concentration ratios for low and high pay for women in full-time and part-time 
employment 1996 
Low pay  High pay 
Full-time  Part-time  Full-time  Part-time 
United States  106  221  76  39 
France  113  217  69  110 
Germany  167  246  33  72 
Netherlands  160  162  38  44 
United Kingdom  118  188  82  53 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Women in full-time work everywhere have a greater risk of low pay and a low presence 
in  high  pay,  as  shown by the concentration ratios in  Table 3.13. The risk of poor pay 
outcomes  for  women  in  full-time  work  are  conspicuously  high  in  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands. Even the somewhat brighter jobs picture for European women in part-time 
work has at best muted support in terms of pay. The concentration of part-time women in 
low pay is less marked in the Netherlands and the UK than in the USA, but more marked 
in Germany. All the European economies have a higher concentration of high-paid part-42  European-American Employment Gap 
time jobs for women than the United States, although the incidence of these is tiny on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
The paper by Connolly and Gregory reviews the record on female employment across the 
five  countries,  with  a particular focus  on  part-time work and relative earnings.  It then 
examines in  more detail  part-time work by  women in  Britain, and its  implications for 
earnings mobility. 
(a)  Wonzen 's employnzent in the five economies 
Women's employment has experienced sustained growth over the past 25 years in all five 
economies.  In  the  United States employment of men  has  also  been  rising,  albeit  at  a 
slower rate  than  for  women  and  at  a  slightly  falling  employment-to-population  ratio, 
while across the four European economies it has been relatively static, rising significantly 
only in  the Netherlands and post-unification Germany, and tending to decline in France 
and  to  some  extent the  UK.  As  a consequence  women  are  making  up  an  increasing 
proportion  of the  workforce in  both  Europe  and  the  United States. This proportion  is 
remarkably similar across the five countries, at close to 45 per cent, and only marginally 
lower in the European economies than in the United States (Graph 3.2). 
This  growing  proportion  of women  in  the  labour  force  reflects  the  sustained rise  in 
female participation, now over 60 per cent in  each of the four European economies and 
72 per cent in the United States (where male participation is also higher) (Graph 3.3). 
The main source of this increased female participation is the 25-34 age group, where each 
decade has seen a further 'filling-in' of the traditional dip in participation during the peak 
years for family formation and child-rearing. Graph 3.4 illustrates this for the UK, but the 
pattern is  similar in  the other countries.  The rise in  female  participation is  particularly 
dramatic in  the case of the Netherlands, where employment of women in this age-group 
has risen from under 25  per cent in the early 1970s to over 70 per cent now. Women in 
the  United  States  are  more  likely  to  be  in  employment  at  all  ages,  with  the  gap 
particularly striking in the older age groups; not only are women in the USA more likely 
to work, they are also likely to have a longer working life. Chapter 3: Earnings Mobility 
Graph 3.2  Female employment as percentage of  total employment (head count) 
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Graph 3.4  Employm,ent rates of  women by age group,  UK 
80 
70 
60 
i 
l 
50  .I 
I 
I 
I 
40  I 
30 
! 
I 
I 
! 
I 
20  --- - - i ..  .  ----~------~,.-- ------- - . ----------1 
1 5-1 9  2 0-2 4  2 5-3 4  3 5-44  4 5-5 4  55-59  6 0-64 
-- 1965 -- 1970 --1980--1990 --- 1997 
43 44  European-American Employment Gap 
(b)  Part-time work 
A  further,  overlapping dimension  of employment growth  has  been  in  part-time  work. 
This has  applied to  both men and women, and in  each of the economies. As  shown in 
Graph 3.5, in France part-time work has risen from 6 to  16 per cent of total employment 
since the early 1970s, while in  the Netherlands 36 per cent of workers now work part-
time. The position of the United States is again an intermediate one. 
Graph 3.5  Part-time as% of  total employment (men+ women) 
40 
35 
30 
25 
15 
10 
5  _j 
0 1-- ···- ·---l---··-·--,···--··-·····- --- ·- ~ - - · ··-· ·· · -
1973  1979  1983  1990 
.  ··-,-·- · ·· - ·- - --·-··········--- - --1-- - -
1993  1999 
--USA  --France -Germany -*-Netherlands ~ uK 
Although  part-time work  by  men  has  been  growing significantly, it continues to  be  a 
predominantly  female  activity,  with  80  to  90  per cent  of part-time  workers  in  most 
countries being women. The Netherlands is a notable exception to this, with one-third of 
part-time work undertaken by men (mainly youths). 
The preponderance of women  in  part-time work reflects its  role in  her life-cycle. The 
growth in opportunities for part-time work has allowed more women to combine labour 
market  work  and  earnings  with  responsibilities  for  childcare,  and  as  a  consequence 
contributing to  the  rising participation  of women  in  the  25-44  age  group.  Changes in 
fertility patterns, delayed family formation  and smaller family sizes are other important 
contributory factors. This life-cycle pattern is clearly illustrated in figures for the UK in 
Table 3.14. 
This  role,  however,  varies  across  the  European  economies;  while  part-time  work 
predominates  in  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and the  UK,  full-time  work remains  more Chapter 3: Eanzings Mobility  45 
common in France (Table 3.15). The main difference, however is with the USA, where 
women's part-time work is polarised between young people, still in education, and older, 
pre-retirement, age-groups. There is thus a clear transatlantic difference in  the role that 
part-time work plays for in women's life-cycle. 
Table 3.14  Role of  part-time workfor women bv age group, United Kingdom,  1995 
Age  % Part-time  Age  % Part-time 
<20  47.3  35-<40  47.8 
20-<25  73.7  40--<45  47.4 
25-30  70.8  45-<50  48.0 
30--<35  56.5  50--<60  43.5 
Table 3.15  Employment rates o.fmothers with a child aged 10 or under,  1993 (%) 
France 
Germany 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
European Union 
Source: EC Childcare Network 1996 
(c)  Pay gaps 
Full-time  Part-time 
40  20 
18  30 
7  ~ 
18  34 
36.4  18.6 
Despite women's growing presence in employment, a significant gender pay gap persists; 
women still earn on average only about 75 per cent of the hourly wage of men. While the 
gender pay gap has been tending to narrow for women in full-time work, the gap between 
full- and part-time work is widening, notably in  the United States, the Netherlands and 
the UK.  Further, the part-time pay gap is now  emerging as  an  important phenomenon, 
involving men  as  well  as  women.  As  Graph  3.6 shows, not only do part-time workers 
receive  hourly  pay  rates  below  those  for  full-time  workers,  but  in  each  country  the 
disparity is greater for men than for women. The role of low pay among part-time jobs is 
further illustrated in  Graph 3.7 where we see that the median rate of pay for part-time 
workers is only marginally higher than the bottom decile rate for full-time employees. 46  European-American Employment Gap 
Graph 3.6 Median hourly earnings of  part-time workers as% of  full-time earnings, by gender, 
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(d)  Women in part-time work in Britain 
Britain  clearly  presents  one  of the  most  interesting  instances  of part-time  work  for 
women, with the highest incidence (after the Netherlands), rapid growth, and a substantial 
pay  gap.  Connolly and Gregory give  a  more detailed analysis of the  career paths and 
earnings  status  of women  in  Britain  involved in  part-time  work.  They concentrate on 
women aged 22 and over, to leave aside issues of students and the youth labour market 
and focus  on  part-time  work in  the  adult woman's life-cycle.  They use  microdata for Chapter 3: Earnings Mobility  47 
Britain from  the New  Earnings Survey Panel  Data-set (NESPD) a panel  of women  in 
employment  between  197 5  and  2000  containing  employment  records  for  a  total  of 
193,500 women, of whom around 57,000 are present in any year. 
The first insight to emerge from the microdata is the pervasive role of part-time work in 
the adult working life of the contemporary British woman. Of the women in  the survey 
who have been in employment for 5 years or more, 30 per cent have always worked full-
time, 22 per cent have only ever worked part-time, while 49 per cent have worked in both 
capacities. So a working life comprising both full-time and part-time work is the modal 
pattern.  Moreover, as  Table 3.16  shows, the  average time spent in  employment by all 
three  categories,  including  completed  and  uncompleted  spells,  is  closely  similar.  For 
those who have worked on both a full-time and a part-time basis, the average distribution 
of working  years  between  the  two  states  is  again  approximately  equal  (although  the 
distributions at the individual level covers all combinations, with no 'typical' pattern.) 
Table 3.16  Average time spent in full-time and part-time work: women aged 22 and over with at 
least five vears in emplovment 
Full-time only 
Part-time only 
10.3 
9.9 
Years 
Mixed: 
Full-time years 
Part-time years 
Years 
11.3 
5.3 
6.0 
As women's part-time work has increased over the past 25  years, so has the raw pay gap 
between  full- and  part-time  work.  The  differential  in  hourly  earnings,  which  was 
negligible in the mid-1970s, is now around 14 per cent (Table 3.17). 
Table 3.17  Raw Pav Gap in Hourlv Eanzin~s. Women in Full-time and Part-time Work 
1975-79 
1980-84 
1985-90 
Average gap(%)  Average gap(%) 
-2.8  1990-95  -13.7 
-8.0  1995-99  -14.1 
-12.2 
The  raw  pay  gap  of course  reflects  all  differences  in  characteristics  between  the 
individuals working in  the two categories. Women whose market wages are potentially 
lower, due for example to limited work experience or lower educational attainment, may 
be expected to choose part-time work more frequently,  although  the  degree of overlap 
through the  'mixed' category above indicates this can at most be part of the explanation. 48  European-American Employment Gap 
Using  fixed  effects  estimation  to  control  for  all  time-invariant  individual  attributes, 
Connolly and Gregory find an  average wage penalty to part-time status of 6.6 per cent 
(Table 3.18). This is identified for the same individuals who have moved between full-
and part-time status within the observation period. 
Table 3.18  Fixed effects estimation a,{ earnings o.fwomen infull-time and part-time employment, 
1975-2000 
Dependent variable: In of  hourlv earnings 
Variable 
Part-time status 
Part-time years 
Part-time years squared 
Full-time years 
Full-time years squared 
Age 
Age squared 
Also included: year dummies, part-time*time interaction 
Coefficient 
-0.066 
0.018 
-0.00002 
0.043 
-0.00098 
0.030 
-0.00035 
R2
2 =  0.299 
Standard error 
.002 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
While  .a  pay  penalty  for  current  part-work  may  be  regarded  as  a  compensating 
differential, the striking feature of the regression results from a dynamic perspective is 
the  differential  return  to  part-time  as  against  full-time  work.  Each  year of part-time 
employment adds 1.8 per cent to earnings while a year of full-time employment adds 4.3 
per cent. Having worked part-time is significantly, and permanently, less valuable for a 
women's future earnings than a corresponding spell in full-time work. As part-time work 
becomes  an  increasing part of a woman's life-cycle this  lower return  will  continue to 
accentuate the pay gap. 
(e)  Earnings mobility for wonzen working part-tinze 
Connolly and Gregory also look directly at year-on-year earnings changes for women in 
full-time and part-time employment. The transitions for 1995-96 by decile groups within 
the female earnings distribution are summarised in Table 3.19. The differing distributions 
of full- and  part-time  women  across  low  and  high  pay  has  already  been  documented 
above,  where the high concentration ratios for part-timers in  low pay in particular was 
emphasised. The first insight added by the table is that women changing from full-time to 
part-time work are not a random sample of women previously working full-time, but are 
significantly skewed towards  lower earners.  The  women  who  move  from  full-time  to 
part-time employment are  between  two  and three times  more  likely to come from  the Chapter 3: Earnings Mobility  49 
lowest deciles, and just over half as likely to come from the top deciles, as are those who 
continue in  full-time work.  In  terms of their exit positions in the earnings distribution, 
those moving to part-time work have earnings more closely resembling those of part-time 
than  those of other full-time  workers.  Conversely, women  switching from  part-time to 
full-time work are likely to  come from  higher earnings deciles among part-timers than 
those who remain in part-time work. Thus individual transitions both out of full-time into 
part-time  work  and  in  reverse  are  correlated  with  relative  earnings,  tending  towards 
earnings polarisation in the two categories. 
Table 3.19  Ean1ings transitions 1995-96, women in full-time and part-time work(%) 
1995 decile position  group distribution 1996 decile position 
in 1995  1-3  4-7  8-10 
(a) Full-time in both years 
1- 3  13.9  75.2  23.5  1.2 
4- 7  46.3  4.6  84.9  10.5 
8- 10  39.9  0.6  6.8  92.6 
(b) Full-time to part-time transition 
1- 3  34.4  63.8  29.8  6.4 
4- 7  43.3  15.8  64.3  19.9 
8- 10  22.4  5.2  12.6  82.3 
(c) Part-time in both years 
1- 3  41.4  85.2  13.1  1.6 
4- 7  33.5  13.8  80.2  6.0 
8- 10  25.1  3.0  8.1  88.9 
(d) Part-time to full-time transition 
1- 3  34.7  71.4  26.1  2.5 
4- 7  38.3  27.6  64.9  7.4 
8- 10  27.0  7.1  26.9  66.0 
Women  with  low  full-time  earnings  tend  to  improve  their  ranking  in  the  earnings 
distribution  when  they  go  part-time,  while  high  earners  clearly lose,  and those  in  the 
middle  range  are  both  more  likely  to  move  up  and  to  move  down  the  earnings 
distribution. Similarly, among women moving from  part-time to  full-time employment, 
those who were low earners in part-time employment tend to gain relative to those who 
remain either part-time or full-time, while those who were high earners when part-time 
do less well than both full-time and part-time stayers. Transitions between full-time and 
part-time  work  tend  to  promote  earnings  progression  for  the  low  paid,  but  retard 
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Table 3.20  Eanzings Transitions 1995-96,  Women in  Full-time and Part-time Work,  with and 
without Change of  Job(%) 
1995 decile position  no job change  with job change 
1995  1996 decile position  1995  1996 decile position 
1-3  4-7  8-10  1-3  4-7  8-10 
(a) Full-time in both years 
1-3  15.1  78.2  20.8  1.0  16.1  53.7  43.1  3.2 
4-7  47.7  4.2  86.6  9.2  44.1  8.3  70.2  21.6 
8-10  37.2  0.5  6.6  92.9  39.8  1.3  9.1  89.6 
No of  persons  21111  2710 
(b) Full-time to part-time 
1-3  34.0  63.5  30.9  5.6  35.8  65.4  25.2  9.5 
4-7  43.7  9.7  68.9  21.4  41.4  42.2  44.2  13.6 
8-10  22.2  3.4  11.7  84.9  22.8  12.3  16.0  71.6 
No of  persons  1463  355 
(c) Part-time to part-time 
1-3  40.2  86.3  12.3  1.4  53.7  77.4  19.6  3.0 
4-7  33.8  12.3  81.9  5.8  30.3  31.1  60.4  8.4 
8-10  26.0  2.8  7.6  89.6  16.0  6.7  17.2  76.1 
No of  persons  15656  1491 
(d) Part-time to full-time 
1-3  30.7  74.9  22.9  2.1  48.0  64.1  32.7  3.2 
4-7  40.4  27.7  65.3  7.0  31.4  27.5  63.3  9.2 
8-10  28.9  6.8  26.0  67.2  20.6  8.6  31.2  60.2 
No of  persons  1520  452 
More  tentative  results  emerge  when  employment  status  is  set  in  the  context  of job 
changing (Table  3.20). The further subdivision  makes  the  numbers  smaller,  while the 
question asked  'Was the employee in  her present job with  the current employer a year 
ago?' is open to ambiguous interpretations in  the case of promotion or transfer between 
full-time and part-time work. Among women continuing in full-time work, job-changers 
come from similar positions in the earnings distribution to stayers, and, as noted in other 
contexts  elsewhere  in  the  report,  job  changers  from  all  but  the  top  deciles  are 
substantially  more  likely  to  move  up  the  earnings  distribution  than  stayers.  Women 
moving  from  full-time  to  part-time  work  similarly  come  from  the  same  parts  of the 
distribution as stayers, but those from middle and upper earnings positions are substantial 
losers when the move to part-time work also involves a job change. Job-changers among 
part-timers,  both  those remaining part-time and those moving into full-time  work,  are 
heavily drawn  from  the lower earnings groups. In  each case the job-changers from  the 
lower deciles tend to achieve more earnings progression than the stayers. Chapter 3: Earnings Mobility  51 
(f)  Conclusions 
Part-time work is  an  important mechanism through  which  women can combine labour 
market participation with family responsibilities. The opportunity to move between full-
time and part-time work as domestic circumstances evolve is an important form of labour 
market mobility for women ..  But part-time employment typically carries a pay penalty, 
both  while it is  the current status  and,  more  significantly, over the  future  career path, 
through  the  lower earnings  return  to  time  spent  in  part-time  work.  So  this  mobility 
between  types  of employment  comes  at  a  serious  price  for  the  individual.  In  the 
aggregate,  as  more  women  spend more  time  in  part-time work  over the  life-span  this 
adverse status of part-time work threatens increasing polarisation of earnings. 
3.6  The earnings mobility of young workers 
Young workers constitute a group of particular interest to policy-makers. By definition 
they have little or no professional experience and find themselves at the interface of the 
education system and the world of work. In the benchmarking section, youths emerged in 
all  countries as  having one of the  highest concentration ratios of low  pay.  This is  not 
unexpected since  the  labour market  for  young  persons  is  characterised by  low  wages 
relative  to  adults,  as  well  as  high  relative  rates  of unemployment.  However,  young 
persons do get older and must therefore leave the so-called youth labour market at some 
point. 
In  terms  of mobility, earnings profiles - measuring the  way in  which earnings change 
with experience or age- are typically upward sloping, and so on average young persons' 
earnings rise as they get older. How this occurs is an important question. Either a young 
person is  paid a relatively low  wage  in  a particular job at  the  beginning of his  or her 
professional life due to lack of experience, and the wage increases in this job with age. Or 
there are  'entry' jobs for young people starting work for the first time which enable the 
acquisition  of experience,  and  permit the  person  to  apply subsequently for better paid 
jobs requiring professional experience. These observations point to the need to examine 
the kind of jobs young persons occupy, how  long they stay in them,  and the extent to 
which earnings growth occurs within a firm or as a result of changing employer. 52  European-American Employment Gap 
(a)  Mobility and young workers- some international comparisons 
A glance at  recent labour market trends reveals three stylised facts  concerning the  age 
structure of the working population in the countries considered here. Firstly, participation 
rates for prime-age adults (25 to 54 years old) are very similar across countries - ranging 
from  82 to  86  per cent in  1998 (Graph 3.8).These have changed little during the  1990s 
except  for  the  Netherlands  where  there  has  been  a  surge  of  female  employment. 
Employment-to-population ratios vary from  76 per cent in France to  81  per cent in the 
United States in  1998, and are lower than in  1990 except for the Netherlands. Thus the 
main  differences  between  the  countries  lie  in  the  tails  of the  age  distribution  of the 
working population.  A second stylised fact is  that labour force  participation (and as  a 
consequence  employment)  rates  of over  54-year olds  are  much  lower  in  continental 
Europe than the USA and the UK. In the former participation rates are well below 50 per 
cent and are greater than 60 per cent in the latter (Graph 3.9). 
Graph 3.8  Participation rates 25 to 54 year olds 
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Thirdly, there are striking differences between the countries for the  younger age group 
where in  1998, participation rates varied from 28 per cent in France to 70 per cent in the 
UK (Graph  3.10).  The United States  and  the  Netherlands  also  have  high  rates.  In  all 
countries except the Netherlands the rate has fallen since 1990. Naturally, some of these 
differences  reflect  the  nature  of the  education  system  and  the  way  in  which  further 
education is  financed.  In  all  countries there has been a trend increase in  young persons Chapter 3:  Earnings Mobility  53 
Graph 3.  9  Participation and employment rates of  55 to 64 year olds 
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Graph 3.10  Employment and participation rates 15 to 24 year olds (%) 
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staying  on  longer  in  full-time  education  and  there  are  cyclical  effects  resulting  in 
increased In  order to  abstract from country particularities in  terms of the  age at  which 
young persons typically finish full-time education and the relative importance of active 
labour market policies such as employer-provided training and special youth employment 
measures,  individuals  under  the  age  of 30  are  considered  to  be  young  persons.  In 
addition, combining education and work is more prevalent in countries such as the USA 
and  the  UK.  A  first  impression  of mobility  patterns  can  be  gained  from  looking  at 
movements  between  low-paid  and  high-paid  employment,  self-employment  and  non-
employment  in  a  given  year.  Table  3.21  shows  transitions  between  different  labour 
market states for the under 30 age group. While it is clear that young persons do move 
out of the lower deciles of the earnings distribution into higher deciles, it is also striking 
that between 15  and 20 per cent of low-paid young persons move into non-employment 54  European-American Employment Gap 
(unemployment or out of the labour force and possibly into education). This tendency is 
observed in both Europe and the United States. Higher paid young persons are far less 
likely to move into non-employment (between 6 and 9% ). 
Table 3.21  Destinations workers under 30 in lowest 30 per cent (highest 70%) of  the earnings 
distribution in 1995 in follow  in~? year 
Situation in 1996  United States  France  Germany  Netherlands  United Kingdom 
Lowest 30% 
62.2  49.5  68.3  - 54.3 
(8.7)  (7.3)  (8.6)  (5.5) 
Upper 70% 
19.5  29.6  13.5  - 23.6 
(84.6)  (83.3)  (82.7)  (77.7) 
Unemployed 
13.3  8.0  - 3.9 
}  17.5  (6.2)  (2.6)  (1.5) 
Inactive 
}  (5.6)  7.0  8.7  - 17.1 
(2.8)  (4.6)  (14.0) 
Self-employed 
1.0  0.7  1.5  - 1.0 
(1.1)  (0.5)  (1.5)  (1.3) 
'- ' indicates no reliable data available. 
Table 3.22  Percentage of  each age group changing employer in between 1995 and 1996 
Age group  France  Germany  Netherlands  United Kingdom 
16-19  28.7  4.9  21.9  15.1 
20-24  25.8  12.9  15.0  21.5 
25-29  12.9  11.3  5.9  17.8 
30-34  7.2  10.3  5.3  10.4 
35-39  5.6  10.4  5.4  11.6 
40-49  4.0  4.3  2.3  8.0 
50-59  2.2  3.6  1.7  6.9 
60-64  2.9  0.4  5.3  4.8 
Overall  6.9  7.7  5.4  12.0 
Table 3.22 shows that the highest rates are of job mobility are found for individuals aged 
under 25 - ranging from 25 per cent in France to 15 per cent in the Netherlands. Younger 
persons have a greater tendency to change employer and this rate declines quite rapidly in 
most countries although it is still above 10 per cent for the 30-39 age group in both the 
UK and Germany. Thus it is clear that part of the phenomenon of escaping from low pay 
for younger persons is through changing employer, and not simply moving up an internal 
wage hierarchy. 
(b)  Earnings and  job mobility among young persons in France 
The French youth labour market presents a very interesting case study in the context of 
earnings mobility. One of the major developments in the 1980s and 1990s was the rise in 
youth unemployment. This was associated with a decline not only in the employment rate 
of young persons but also in their rate of labour market participation. Increasing numbers Chapter 3: Earnings Mobility  55 
stayed on  to  take the  baccalaureat and undertake  further education.  At the  same time, 
there  have  been  a  number  of special  measures  introduced  aimed  at  enabling  young 
persons  to  obtain employer-provided training,  and at  providing incentives for firms  to 
employ young workers. Furthermore, there is evidence that the labour market for young 
persons has served as  a  'buffer' to absorb the successive shocks that have affected the 
French labour market - the  anti-inflation  policy implemented in  1983, the  'franc fort' 
exchange rate policy of the late  1980s, the  objective of remaining inside the European 
Monetary  system  in  the  early  1990s  and  the  restrictive  policy  measures  used  in  the 
attainment of the Maastricht criteria thereafter.  The consequence of the period of slow 
growth  and  austerity that dominated much  of the  1990s,  has  meant that the  transition 
from full-time education to stable employment is no longer automatic and often involves 
a  series  of  temporary  jobs  or  training  placements  accompanied  by  periods  of 
unemployment.  This  part  of the  report  - based  on  research  by  Stephen  Bazen  - is 
concerned with  what happens once young persons get a foothold in  the regular labour 
market. 
(c)  Earnings mobility of  young persons in France in the 1990s 
As pointed out earlier, young persons typically begin working life in low-paying jobs -
over half are found in the lowest three deciles of the earnings distribution. This is clearly 
a transitory phenomenon since, of those who remain in  employment, less than  half are 
still there one year later and after two years, less than 40 per cent are still there. For the 
over-30s  group  as  a  whole,  around  20  per cent are  found  in  the  lowest  three  deciles 
earnings distribution. Furthermore, out of young persons in the lowest three deciles, those 
in the lowest decile have the highest probability of upward movement other things being 
equal. Using a logit model, it is estimated that the probability of escape is an increasing 
function of educational attainment, and is generally higher for males and those living in 
the  Paris  area.  A striking finding  is  that the  probability of escaping from  low  pay no 
longer  increases  after  the  first  ten  years  in  the  labour  market.  This  suggests  that 
individuals  who  do  not  move  out  of low-paying jobs while  they  are  young  may  get 
trapped. 
It was pointed out above that young persons have high rates of job mobility- more than 
25  per cent for under 25s and more than  12  per cent for 25  to 29  year olds.  Such job 56  European-American Employment Gap 
changing is  on  average  associated  with  movements  up  the  earnings  distribution  after 
having taken  into account education, experience and other characteristics. Interestingly 
job-changing also increases the probability of escaping low  pay for older workers even 
though  they tend not to change employer to  the  same extent. Thus on  the basis of the 
French experience, the upward slope of the age earnings profile is determined in part by 
within job earnings  mobility  and also  by earnings  growth  resulting from  between job 
mobility. It would appear that certain jobs serve as "stepping stones" for young persons 
entering the labour market. 
(d)  Cohort effects and the return to education and experience 
In  view  of the  fact  that more  young persons stay on  at  school, the population in  work 
aged under 30 in  the middle and late 1990s has a higher average level of education and 
fewer years of experience on average than the same age group in the 1980s. Furthermore, 
the tendency of firms to retain more experienced workers and hire fewer young persons 
will  have  depressed  the  labour market  for  young  persons  entering the  labour market 
during the 1990s. This has given rise to lower rates of return to education and experience. 
Table 3.23  Rates of  return* to different education levels and experience in France 
BAC 
Deug (second year university diploma) 
or equivalent 
Licence (full degree) or higher 
1990  1998 
0.336  0.203 
(0.163)  (0.101) 
0.691  0.432 
(0.264)  (0.191) 
1.293  0.941 
(0.364)  (0.353) 
Return to experience after two years  0.063  0.052 
Return to experience aft___!r five years  0.045  0.037 
* return compared to  someone with  no  qualifications. The figure  in  parentheses represents the  marginal 
return to the diploma in question. 
Table 3.23 shows that for young persons under the age of 30, the return to staying on to 
take the baccalaureat has fallen between 1990 and 1998 from 33 per cent to 20 per cent 
more than someone with no qualifications, and from 16 per cent to 10 per cent compared 
to the basic secondary education certificate (taken at the age of 16). Overall and marginal 
rates of return have also diminished at higher educational levels. Furthermore, the return 
to  an  additional  year's experience  has  fallen  for  young  persons,  say,  with  five  years 
experience  from  4.5  per cent  to  3.7  per  cent  over  the  same  period.  Young  persons 
entering the  labour market in  France during the  1990s have fared less  well  in  relative Chapter 3: Earnings Mobility  57 
terms than those who started out in the 1980s. There is also evidence that the real wages 
of younger workers entering the labour market in the late 1990s are lower than those who 
entered in the early 1990s at a given age and in particular for less skilled workers. While 
real earnings increase as the cohort grows older, they are lower on average than previous 
cohorts at each age (see Graph 3.11). 
Graph 3.11  Average real hourly youth earnings by age,  France 1991-98 (Francs of  1991) 
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(e)  Changes in the conzposition of  young persons' e1nploynzent 
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The composition of employment and patterns of job mobility have also changed in the 
last fifteen years. There has been a noticeable decline in the proportion of young persons 
aged 20 to 29 in unskilled manual occupations between 1985 and 1995 and an increase in 
the  proportion  occupying middle  management and intermediate professional  positions. 
The proportions are very similar in the two years for occupations such as clerical (32 per 
cent), skilled manual (more than 20 per cent), and shop workers (around 12% ).  However 
when it comes to the 30 to 39 age group, the occupational composition of employment is 
almost identical in the two years except for a few  less unskilled manual and a few more 
shop workers in  1995. This suggests that the routes into certain types of occupations have 
changed.  The increase in  the  numbers  with  higher education  is  reflected in  a  greater 
proportion already in middle management and professional positions at an  earlier age in 
1995. For the 30 to 39 age group, the proportion is roughly the same in  1995 as it was in 
1985.  Occupations such  as  shop  assistants  appear to  serve as  a stepping stone in  both 
years,  but  working  when  young  in  a  manual  occupation  is  no  longer  necessary, 
apparently, in order to accede to a technical, professional or supervisory position in 1995. 58  European-American Employment Gap 
These  differences  in  the  passage of young  persons  into  more  highly  skilled jobs are 
reflected to a certain extent in patterns of job mobility. The proportion of 25  to 30 year 
olds  with  less  than  twelve months tenure  is  twice  as  high  (33%) in  1995  compared to 
1985, and it is one and half times more (19%) for 31  to 35  year olds. In  1985 less than 
half of 25  to  30  year olds  had been  with  the  same  employer for  less  than  four  years 
compared to more than two thirds in 1995. These figures suggest that those labour market 
entrants in the  1990s without higher level diplomas have  a more unstable early labour 
market experience. 
(f)  Conclusions 
The youth labour market is a key issue in the analysis of earnings and job mobility. The 
mechanisms by which young workers find their place in  the regular labour market and 
how  their situation  evolves  thereafter  have  important  implications  for  policy-makers. 
Evidence has  been presented here showing that while they often begin working life in 
low-paying jobs, young persons move up the earnings hierarchy within the firm as well as 
through changing employer. Certain occupations - such as  working as  shop assistant -
often act as stepping stones, others are more permanent. Evidence from France suggests 
that the  labour market position of young persons has  deteriorated in  the  1990s in  two 
respects. Not only have rates of return to education and experience declined, but also it 
would appear that cohorts entering the labour market in the 1990s have on average lower 
real  earnings than preceding cohorts. This being said, there is  also evidence that young 
persons have more direct access to higher level occupations at an earlier age than in the 
1980s. 
3.  7  Conclusions 
This  chapter  has  examined  earnings  mobility  at  the  individual  level  across  the  four 
selected European economies, and between them and the United States. The analysis was 
set in the context of the American-European jobs gap. 
Our findings  do  not give systematic support to  the view of rigid labour markets in  the 
European  economies  inhibiting job growth.  In  terms  of the  overall  level  of earnings Chapter 3: Earnings Mobility  59 
mobility each of the European economies, with the exception of France, shows greater 
earnings mobility than the United States; and France is level with the USA. In terms of 
one of the key indicators, the proportion escaping from low-paid employment in any one 
year, the mobility record is found to be very similar across the five economies. Divergent 
findings,  however, emerge for transitions from  low pay to non-employment in  the UK, 
which has the high rate, while the United States is very similar to France and Germany. 
The highest degree of upward earnings mobility from the bottom deciles occurs in France 
and  Germany,  with  the  United States  again  in  a middle  ranking,  as  it  is  in  terms  of 
stability in the top deciles. In  terms of mobility by those returning from unemployment, 
upwards  earnings progression is  less  frequent  in  the  United States than  in  any  of the 
European  economies  with  the  exception  of  the  Netherlands,  and  substantially  less 
frequent than in the UK. 
In  all  countries  a  highly  significant  minority  (25  to  45%)  of  workers  experience 
· reductions  in  real  hourly  earnings  in  a  given  year.  Given  that  overall  average  real 
earnings have been rising in Europe and have been fairly stable in the United States, this 
finding indicates that comparing group averages over time does not give the full picture. 
Furthermore,  it  suggests  that  there  is  a  high  degree  of wage  flexibility  in  Europe, 
including  in  a downwards  direction.  Contrary to  what  is  often  claimed, the  European 
economies are not characterised by real wage rigidity while American wages are flexible. 
Rather at the individual level wages everywhere show a substantial degree of downwards 
as well as upwards flexibility. 
A  key  role  is  found  for  job  mobility.  Job-changing  is  generally  found  to  result  in 
increased  earnings  in  both  real  and  relative  terms.  While  most  job-changing  occurs 
among individuals in  the middle of the earnings distribution in France and Germany, in 
the USA and the UK it mainly concerns workers in  the upper and lower tails. However, 
job-changing  with  an  intervening  period of non-employment is  found  to  involve  real 
earnings reductions for large proportions of workers in the United States, France and the 
UK. These downward movements in earnings point to  another form of wage flexibility 
common  to  the  USA  and  certain  European  countries,  rather  than  to  a  United 
States/Europe divide. 60  European-American Employment Gap 
The growth of part-time work by women  in  the  European economies is  moving them 
closer to American participation rates, although a substantial employment gap remains. 
But in the European economies part-time work is at its peak in the childcare years, while 
in  the  United  States  it  peaks,  for  adults,  among  older  women.  In  both  countries  a 
substantial pay penalty attaches to part-time status. This is of greater social significance 
in the European economies, where a substantial segment of life-cycle employment comes 
after the main part-time years. The evidence is that a spell of part-time employment not 
only carries a current wage penalty but bears a significant future earnings penalty over 
the  remaining  years  after the  return  to  full-time  work.  Mobility between full-time  and 
part-time work comes at a high price, which does not characterise the United States. 
Young persons feature naturally in  the processes of earnings and job mobility. For most 
individuals  low-paid  employment  is  a  transitory  situation  since  earnings  grow  with 
experience either with the same employer or by leaving low-paying, stepping-stone jobs 
and moving into better paid employment. In  all  countries there has been a tendency to 
staying longer in full-time education, however in France this has been exaggerated by the 
depressed state of labour market in the 1990s. Not only has the rate of return to education 
declined, but also successive cohorts have lower real earnings than the preceding ones at 
a given age. 
Overall,  therefore,  the  stereotype  of wage  and  employment  rigidity  in  the  European 
economies relative to the flexible American economy, is not sustained. The issue of the 
jobs  gap,  however,  remains.  One  clear  area  is  the  labour  market  role  of  women, 
particularly in higher paid jobs. Another is the participation rate of men, particularly older 
men, who disproportionately withdraw from work in Europe. Chapter 4 
Issues of Literacy and Job Quality 
4.1  Literacy, pay and employment 
The level of skills and the return to  them are one of the most important factors cited to 
explain  both  the  growing  wage  inequality  in  the  United  States  and  the  difference  in 
inequality between the USA and Europe, and, through this, the transatlantic employment 
gap.  It  is  argued  that  the  relative  wage  of the  unskilled  in  Europe  has  not  fallen 
sufficiently to stimulate relative demand in  the labour market for this category of skills. 
However,  several  authors  have  already raised important doubts on  the  validity of this 
argument. For the present project Miihlau and Horgan have systematically analysed the 
issue using information available from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS). 
The skills argument is usually based on educational attainment, measured by credentials 
in  the form  of official certificates and diplomas, or by years  of formal  schooling. This 
may be less of a problem for analysing changes over time within a single country but is 
notoriously difficult to apply across countries,  as  no two systems of education are  the 
same.  The  great advantage of the  IALS  data is  that it provides  a uniform  measure of 
(cognitive) skills across countries based on scores on identical literacy tests. The survey 
was jointly organised by Statistics Canada and the OECD for a range of countries and 
was given to respondents in  1994
4 
•• Three types of intensive paper-and-pencil tests were 
used:  prose,  documentation  and  quantitative  literacy.  The  three  outcomes  are  highly 
correlated and the authors have used the average. The respondents were also interviewed 
about  the  skills  needed for  their jobs and  these job characteristics  have  been  used  to 
extend the analysis to labour demand. 
The  research  was  performed for  the  dataset  as  a  whole,  distinguishing  between  five 
Anglo-Saxon countries (representing flexible  labour markets) on  the one hand and five 62  European-Am.erican Employment Gap 
Continental  countries  (as  examples  of regulated  labour  markets)  on  the  other
5
.  The 
purpose of the approach was to see whether labour market outcomes by skills depend on 
the differences in labour market institutions or, alternatively, on  the supply and demand 
of different levels of skills. The former view, expressed by Krugman, asserts a trade-off 
between higher relative wages for the low skilled and lower employment. According to 
the supply-and-demand view, however, higher wages for the low skilled reflect a better 
labour market position and go together with a favourable employment situation. As  the 
argument  hinges  on  skills,  their  calibration  by  means  of literacy  levels  rather  than 
educational attainment may affect the debate substantially. 
Figure 4.1  Average literacy scores by educational level 
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Figure  4.1  shows  the  difference  between  the  internationally  standardised  educational 
credentials  (ISCED)  and  the  literacy  scores.  Particularly  striking  is  that  the  lower 
educational  credentials  in  the  Continental  countries  are  associated  with  much  higher 
levels of literacy than in  the  Anglo-Saxon  world.  For people with  less than  secondary 
education (ISCED 0-1)  the average literacy score across  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries is 
208, which compares to 248 on the Continent. Similarly, the literacy of people with lower 
secondary  education  (ISCED  2)  is  much  better  in  Continental  countries.  For  upper 
secondary and tertiary education, on the other hand, no systematic differences occur. The 
4 The later extension of the IALS, for  1998, to a few more countries could not be used as no microdata have 
yet been made available. 
5 Canada, the USA, New Zealand, Ireland and the UK on the on hand and Belgium (the Dutch-speaking 
Flanders part only), Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland on the other. Unfortunately, out of 
the set of five countries covered in this report France is missing as no data are available. Chapter 4:  Literacy; Job Quality  63 
unconditional use of educational credentials seems to  invite biased results regarding the 
effects of cognitive skills on labour market outcomes, particularly at the lower end
6
. 
(a) Skills, pay and enzploynzent 
In the research, each person was assigned a literacy decile based on the distribution of the 
pooled data for all ten countries, i.e. for each country the proportion in each of the deciles 
of  the  pooled  distribution  was  calculated.  Figure  4.2  presents  this  internationally 
standardised  distribution  for  each  of  the  countries.  On  this  measure  we  find  high 
proportions of low-skilled persons for the  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  particularly the  UK 
and Ireland, and low shares for the Continent. At the other extreme, Canada and the US 
also have high shares of the best educated, while Sweden beats all with 22 per cent of its 
population  in  the  highest  IALS  decile.  The average  level  of literacy  in  Anglo-Saxon 
countries (271) lags significantly behind that of Continental countries (286). 
Figure 4.2  National skills distributions o.f population aged 16-65, international literacy deciles 
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First, it was investigated how skills, on this measure, relate to pay. A particular focus was 
the pay gap between the median and the lower quintiles of the literacy distribution. The 
gaps were estimated with the help of a wage regression estimated separately for the ten 
countries, controlling for gender, age and language
7
, and annual hours as  yearly earnings 
6 In their paper, the authors extensively deal with the effects of immigrants on literacy scores, but we leave 
this out here as it appears to make little difference to the final outcomes. 
7 If a person's first language was different from that of the test. 64  European-American Employment Gap 
were reported,. Dummies indicate whether the respondent belongs to the first or second, 
or fourth  and fifth  literacy quintile of the population so that the regression coefficients 
estimate the earning differences between workers relative to  workers  belonging to the 
third quintile: 
(2) lnEamingsii =  b1LitQuin1ii + b2LitQuin2;j + b3LitQuin4,5ii + BXii +  u;j 
The first-quintile impact )(coefficient b1) appears to be significantly larger for the Anglo-
Saxon  countries  (-.211)  compared  to  the  Continent  (-.106)  (see  Table  4.1).  This  is 
consistent with both the trade-off and the supply-and-demand hypothesis. 
The next step in testing the trade-off hypothesis was to examine employment chances in 
relation to the levels of literacy, again focusing on  the gap between the median and the 
lowest quintile and also controlling for other personal characteristics. Logistic regressions 
on employment chances were estimated separately for the ten countries, with ~j being the 
logged odds of being employed: 
(  4) L;j = b1 LitQuin1ii + b2LitQuin2ii + b3LitQuin4,5  ii + BX  ij +  uii 
Surprisingly,  relative  employment  chances  at  lower  literacy  levels  are  better  in  the 
Continental countries (b1 = -.753 against -1.145) (see Table 4.1). 
CA  IE  NZ  UK  US  A.-S.  BE  DE  NL  SE  CH  Cont. 
earnings  -.181  -.313  -.131  -.141  -.291  -.211  -.076  -.079  -.139  -.092  -.144  -.106 
em  lo  ment  -1.123  -.980  -1.279  -1.135  -1.208  -1.145  -.926  -.794  -.711  -.934  -.399  -.753 
To test whether this finding is robust other measures of employment difference were also 
used,  including  the  employment-rate  ratio  for  Q1  to  Q3.  This  appears  to  make  a 
substantial  difference  to  the  position  of the  USA  and  Germany  although  the  Anglo-
Saxon/Continental divide remains
8 and there is no indication that higher wages are indeed 
traded  off  against  lower  employment.  Figure  4.3  plots  the  delogged  regression 
coefficients  of  the  wage  regression  against  the  employment-rate  ratios  (excluding 
immigrants). It is obvious that the relationship between the relative wages and the relative 
employment chances of low-skilled workers is not negative (as predicted by the trade-off 
hypothesis). Across all countries, the relationship is slightly positive (which is consistent 
8 But it is now only significant for the population excluding immigrants. Chapter 4: Literacy; Job Quality  65 
with  the  supply-and-demand  hypothesis).  Within  the  country  groups,  however,  the 
relationship is slightly negative. This may indicate that there is a trade-off between wage 
position and employment chances but that this  trade-off is dominated by other factors 
giving rise to  the differences between the country groups. The relative supply of low-
skilled workers is the first difference that comes to mind. 
Figure 4.3  Relative wages and employment ratesfirst-quintile 
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Figure 4.4  Composite 'expected wage' index 
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Finally,  a  composite  index  of the  relative  disadvantage  of low-skilled  workers  was 
computed: the ratio of the  'expected wage'  of quintile-1  workers to quintile-3  workers. 
This is not the wage a workers would expect to receive when employed but the average 
wage weighted by the chance of finding employment (see Figure 4.4). The low  skilled 
fare  best in  Switzerland where quintile-1  workers  'expect' to receive 80 percent of the 
'expected'  wages  of quintile-3  workers.  Sweden  follows  and  Belgium  ranks  third, 66  European-American Employnzen.t Gap 
followed  by  Germany  and  the  Netherlands.  New  Zealand  and  United  Kingdom  are 
Anglo-Saxon countries at the same level as  the Netherlands and Germany. The situation 
is  worse  in  Canada,  the  USA  and  Ireland.  Overall,  in  the  five  Continental-European 
countries people with  poor cognitive skills do  relatively  well  while  they  do relatively 
poorly in Anglo-Saxon countries. The Continental average of the expected-wage ratios is 
significantly higher. We may hence conclude that the overall relative position of workers 
with low  skills is better in  Continental countries than  in  the  Anglo-Saxon countries, a 
finding that supports the supply-and-demand hypothesis. 
job requirenzents and the denzandfor skills 
The IALS also contains data on the reading and writing requirements of the jobs people 
occupy.  The  authors  used  this  to  examine  whether  there  are  differences  in  the  skill 
requirements of jobs between countries and whether these correspond to the above skill 
endowments of the countries. On the basis of self-reported variables they constructed a 
24-point scale, distinguishing four levels of requirements ranging from no requirements 
at level 1 (0 points) via low (1-4) and medium (5-14) to high requirements at level 4 (15-
24  ), to enable international comparison. 
Figure 4.5  National distributions of  job requirements 
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Figure 4.5 presents the distribution of jobs by skill requirements
9 across the deciles in the 
same way as Figure 4.3 did for persons. It is clear that the proportion of low-requirement 
9 Accounting for hours worked Chapter 4:  Literacy; Job Quality  67 
jobs  is  much  higher  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries  than  on  the  Continent,  with  the 
exception of Belgium. However, the proportion of high-level jobs is  also considerably 
larger in Canada, the US and New Zealand. Consequently, the average job requirement of 
the Continental countries (12.4) exceeds the Anglo-Saxon average (11.7) by only a small 
margin.  Germany  has  the  highest  average  level,  while  Ireland  occupies  the  lowest 
position. 
Employees  with  low  cognitive  skills  appear  to  be  strongly  concentrated  in  low-
requirement jobs. For example,  25  per cent of the jobs in  the  first  requirement-decile 
across all countries are occupied by workers from the first literacy-decile, and 41  per cent 
from the first literacy-quintile. However, workers with low literacy also find employment 
in jobs that demand more reading and writing proficiency from their holders. In order to 
get a more balanced picture of the demand for low-skilled workers, a demand index for 
workers belonging to literacy decile din country j was constructed, adapting the approach 
of Katz and Murphy ( 1992): 
10 
Ddi = LSiiEid,pooled 
i 
where i refers to the job requirement decile (pooled data), Sij is the share of i-decile jobs 
in  the total  employment in  country j  (in time equivalents), and  E;dpooled  is  the share of 
decile d workers in the employment of job-requirement decile i in the pooled data. The 
main differences from the index suggested by Katz and Murphy are, first, the calculation 
for ten decile groups rather than three skill group (high, medium, low) and, second, the 
calculation on the basis of the skill  composition of the job-requirement deciles for the 
pooled  sample  instead  of  the  skill  composition  of  occupation-industry  cells  for  a 
reference category. It is estimated that Ireland with  18.1  percent has the highest share of 
jobs suited for low-skilled (first-quintile) workers, followed by Belgium and Canada (see 
Table 4.2). Relatively low proportions of such jobs are found for New Zealand, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Germany. The average share of  jobs for the low skilled is 14.7 percent in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries and 13.2 percent in the Continental-European countries. 
From a demand-and-supply perspective, the ratio of people with a given level of skill to 
the number of jobs requiring this level of skill is more important as a determinant of the 
relative labour market position of a skill group than the number or share of suitable jobs. 68  European-American Employment Gap 
A net-supply index for the skill groups is constructed by dividing the number of people 
belonging to a literacy decile by the number of  jobs available to them is given by: 
Sd1 I Dd 1 = Fd1Pd1 I Dd1 
(where FdJ is the share of people of country j who belong to literacy decile d and PdJ is the 
employment ratio of decile d workers in country j). This was calculated for the population 
aged 16-65 (excluding students). 
Table 4.2  Demand and supplv of  lol1'-skilled workers 
CA  IE  NZ  UK  US  A-S  BE  DE  NL  SE  CH Cont. 
Jobs for low-skilled workers  14.6  18.1  12.9  13.8  14.0  14.7  16.5  11.6  14.0  12.1  11.9  13.2 
Net supply index  2.24  3.25  2.59  3.18  2.57  2.77  2.21  2.01  1.54  1.01  2.40  1.83 
Table 4.2 reports these ratios for the lowest literacy quintile. Although Ireland has by far 
the largest number of  jobs for people with low cognitive skills, it also has the highest, that 
is most disadvantageous, ratio of low-skilled workers to jobs (3.25); it is closely followed 
by  the  United Kingdom.  Switzerland is  the Continental country with  the  highest ratio 
while Canada in tum is the Anglo-Saxon country with the lowest ratio. The Netherlands 
and Sweden have the lowest ratios. Although Anglo-Saxon countries have higher shares 
of jobs which are suited for workers with low cognitive skills, the demand for the low 
skilled relative to their supply is significantly smaller in Anglo-Saxon than in Continental 
countries. 
Conclusiou 
Taken together,  the  main findings  are that the economic situation of the low  skilled is 
better in the five Continental countries than in the five Anglo-Saxon countries. The trade-
off hypothesis  found  no  support in  these  data  since  the  employment chances of low-
skilled  workers  are  not worse  in  countries  with  supposedly  more  rigid  and  regulated 
labour markets. By contrast, the supply-and-demand hypothesis is broadly consistent with 
the data: the supply and the net-supply of workers with poor cognitive skills is positively 
related to  the relative wages and relative employment chances of low  skilled workers. 
However, the support for the supply-and-demand view is limited by the fact that neither 
the measure of the overall position nor the measure of net-supply of low-skilled workers 
was able to explain the variance of the situation of the low skilled within the two country 
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4.2  Job quality, job satisfaction and pay 
A further significant dimension in recent debates on  employment has been the issue of 
job quality.  As  discussed  above,  the  area of strongest job growth  within  the  EU has 
typically  been  part-time  employment,  particularly  for  women.  Again  as  documented 
above,  these jobs tend to  be  characterized by lower rates of pay than  are  available to 
comparable workers in full-time jobs, accompanied by poorer conditions across a range 
of employment benefits, such as holiday and pension entitlements, and maternity rights. 
While the EU is working to equalize benefits, disparities remain. This issue, and its inter-
relationship  with  low-wage  employment,  has  been  vividly  posed by Freeman  (1998): 
"Low-Wage  Employment:  Is  More  or  Less  Better?",  and,  for  the  United  States  by 
Burtless (1990) as  'A Future of Lousy Jobs?'' 
Yet,  in  spite  of the  inferior  benefits,  there  is  substantial  evidence  that  only  a  small 
minority  of the  workers  holding  part-time jobs  would  prefer  full-time  work,  or  are 
working part-time only because they  could not find  a full-time job. According  to  the 
OECD(1999, Tables 1.13,  1.14) only 26% of women working part-time would prefer a 
full-time job, ranging from 7%  in  the Netherlands to 42% in Italy, while only  18% of 
women working full-time would prefer part-time work, ranging from 2o/o  in Portugal to 
36%  in  Belgium.  For men  the  proportion  of part-timers  preferring  full-time  work  is 
higher, 59% on average, but the proportion of full-timers preferring part-time work is also 
lower, 9% on average. The share of involuntary part-time status among those in part-time 
work  averages  22%  for  men  and  18%  for  women.  This  suggests  that,  from  the job-
holder's perspective, the quality of the job does not reside only in the level of pay and 
other rewards  involved.  Other attractions,  notably  the  opportunity  to  combine  labour 
market participation and earnings with household work, or continuing education, may be 
of great importance. On an alternative perspective, using part-time work may not be too 
bad a way of getting low-paid work done in society, arguably better than by the full-time 
working poor. 
But  this  in  tum  poses  the  question  of whether  child-rearing  responsibilities  or  the 
acquisition  of advanced  educational  qualifications  should  be  penalized  in  the  labour 70  European-American Employment Gap 
market in this way, and whether job satisfaction is truly measured when the job chosen is 
merely the least unsatisfactory of a set of poor alternatives. 
Measuring  the  quality  of a  job is  clearly  not  a  trivial  matter.  Jobs  differ  in  many 
characteristics  in  addition  to  working  time,  pay  and  non-pay  rewards.  On  a  dynamic 
perspective  these  extend to  job security  and  opportunities  for  advancement.  Working 
conditions and intrinsic job characteristics such  as job content, work intensity,  and the 
relationship with co-workers and managers are  all  relevant to well-being in  work,  with 
the risk of injury or ill-health, physical or mental, only the most extreme instance. In the 
face of this diversity of attributes many argue that it is impossible to construct a single 
metric of  job quality which would allow jobs to be ranked and compared. This skepticism 
is reinforced by the evidence of diversity of preferences among workers. As an example, 
caring for the elderly disabled has formally many of the attributes of a  'lousy job' yet 
elder care is  willingly chosen by many, who  derive high levels of job satisfaction and 
take pride in it as a vocation. 
As  a first  step  in  conceptualizing the  issues  involved in  assessing job quality  and  its 
implications for low-wage employment Rannia Leontaridi and Peter Sloane focus on job 
satisfaction, as reported by job-holders themselves through household surveys, and the 
factors which appear to contribute to this. 
(a)  Analysing reported job satisfaction 
The main part of their analysis draws on the British Household Panel  Survey (BHPS). 
Each  year  this  asks  a  series  of questions  about  the  job  satisfaction  experienced  by 
individuals  in  employment.  The  principal  question  is:  "All  things  considered,  how 
satisfied or dissatisfied are  you  with  your present job?' with  respondents asked to rate 
their level  of satisfaction  on  a  scale from  1,  completely dissatisfied,  to  7,  completely 
satisfied.  Seven  individual  facets  of job satisfaction  are  also  distinguished:  total  pay, 
hours worked, promotion prospects, job security, the work itself, the degree of initiative 
involved,  and  relations  with  the  boss,  with  the  1 - 7  scale  again  used.  Over 7,000 
workers, men and women, report annually over the seven year period 1991-7 used in the 
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The  first  inference  drawn  by  Sloane  and  Leontardini  from  their  analysis  is  that  job 
satisfaction is  only weakly related to  pay.  For men,  the  individual's own  level  of pay 
makes a small contribution to  his overall job satisfaction, while for women there is  no 
effect at  all.  On  the other hand,  the comparison wage,  measured as  the average for the 
gender/age/industry group, has  a negative effect for women, but only marginally so for 
men. When the sample is split between the low-paid (those earning less than two-thirds of 
median  earnings)  and  higher-paid  workers  it  is  notable  that  the  average  level  of job 
satisfaction is higher in  the low-paid group. The role of pay as a significant determinant 
of job satisfaction emerges as  confined to  higher-paid men.  Similarly, the  comparison 
wage impacts on job satisfaction for higher-paid men and women, but not for the low-
paid. The conclusion drawn by Sloane and Leontardini is that many influences other than 
pay are relevant to job satisfaction, and that there is a gender divide in this. 
Table 4.8  Characteristics of  employees bv type and gender (proportions in  o/o) 
Career  Non career 
Male  Female  Male  Female 
Hourly wage: lowest quintile  9.2  20.3  16.7  41.8 
Hourly wage: second quintile  15.4  20.5  23.1  25.1 
Hourly wage: third quintile  19.2  22.0  21.6  16.7 
Hourly wage: fourth quintile  25.5  20.2  19.6  10.1 
Hourly wage: highest quintile  30.7  17.1  19.0  6.4 
average satisfaction levels 
Hourly wage: lowest quintile  5.4  5.8  4.8  5.6 
Hourly wage: second quintile  5.2  5.7  4.72  5.6 
Hourly wage: third quintile  5.2  5.6  4.9  5.4 
Hourly wage: fourth quintile  5.3  5.5  5.0  5.3 
Hourly wage: highestquintile  5.4  5.5  5.1  5.5 
The main differentiating factor for job satisfaction identified by Sloane and Leontardini is 
the opportunity for promotion open to the individual. Promotion prospects in the job are 
identified on the basis of two criteria: a positive response to the survey question "Does 
your current employment situation offer prospects of promotion?" and "Does your salary 
increase on an incremental pay scale?" 67% of responses are classified as job situations 
offering promotion prospects; 42% of these offer promotion prospects on  both criteria, 
32% on  the basis of cited promotion prospects without incremental scales, and 26% on 
the basis of incremental scales only  .. It is notable in their data that non-career women are 
heavily  concentrated  in  low  pay  while  the  pay  position  of career  women  is  broadly 
similar to  that  of non-career  men.  Moreoever,  the  reported  levels  of job satisfaction 72  European-American Employment Gap 
among career and non-career women are broadly similar to  those of career men; non-
career men are the groups among whom overall job satisfaction is typically low. 
In  an  ordered probit explaining the overall level of job satisfaction, promotion prospects 
are  well  determined for both  men  and women,  particularly for men.  This influence is 
stronger and better determined than the wage, the comparison wage and hours of work. 
You mean that these coefficients change most when promotion prospects are introduced? 
(note the change in union coverage!) 
Probing further into the facets  contributing to  overall job satisfaction for low-paid and 
higher-paid workers Sloane and Leontaridi find that for both groups each of the seven 
facets of job satisfaction identified is highly significant. However, satisfaction with the 
level  of pay is  more important as  a source of overall job satisfaction to  the  low-paid, 
while satisfaction with promotion prospects, job security and the job itself make more 
significant  contributions  for  other  workers.  Satisfaction  with  hours  of work  is  rated 
equally by the two groups as a contributor to overall job satisfaction. 
The main pointer from the analysis by Sloane and Leontardini is that the assessment of 
job quality from  the perspective of the individual  should not focus  excessively on the 
current wage but should adopt a broader perspective with opportunities for progression in 
a key role. In this respect their conclusion begins to join up with other approaches to the 
quality of working life. These include approaches which emphasise the role of training in 
enhancing  employability  and  promoting  job  retention.  Other  aspects  include  the 
definition  and promotion of 'good' jobs.  Starting from  health  and safety issues,  these 
broaden from accident prevention to ergonomic considerations and psychological stress. 
They also encompass employment rights, and rights to representation and participation, 
and to training and progression. 
The finding by Sloane and Leontardini of the importance of career prospects dovetails 
with  the  research  agenda  currently  being  pursued  by  the  Low  Wage  Employment 
Network (LoWER) in regard to the professionalisation of low-wage services. It appears 
to  indicate that there would be demand among those working in low-wage services for 
the job-upgrading and personal development implied in such professionalisation. 
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(b)  Comparisons between the UK and the other European countries 
The  European  Community  Household  Panel  Surveys  enable  us  to  make  some 
comparisons among European Countries in relation to the determinants of  job satisfaction 
and hence job quality. Satisfaction with work is ranked according to six categories, which 
for the purpose of this exercise have been collapsed to 0-3  ranks.
10  Unfortunately, the 
ECHP does not contain any questions on  promotion prospects, though the provision by 
the employer of child care facilities, employee health benefits and employer training, may 
well suggest the presence of a well determined internal labour market and get us close to 
it. As shown in Table 4.9, the provision in  particular, of training by the employer has a 
significant effect in raising job satisfaction in each of the four countries. 
There are both similarities and differences across countries in  these results. As  regards 
the  hourly  wage,  this  has  a  positive  effect  on  job satisfaction  in  both  Germany  and 
France, but a negative effect in the Netherlands, while this variable is insignificant in the 
UK equation.  The  predicted  wage  is  insignificant  in  every  case.  Thus,  these  results 
support  the  view  put  forward  earlier  that  pay  is  not  always  a  dominant  factor  in 
determining the worker's perception of  job quality. This should be qualified, however, by 
noting that this is  true controlling for the adequacy of household finances  and a good 
financial situation in general, which are both highly significant. 
The finding of a higher level  of job satisfaction among women  relative to  men  is  not 
replicated outside the UK and indeed is marginally significant and negatively signed for 
the  Netherlands.  Workers in  the  public  sector in  France have  significantly higher job 
satisfaction than  those in  the private sector,  but this  is not found elsewhere. Having a 
permanent contract only matters in  Germany and to a lesser extent in  the Netherlands. 
This seems consistent with the earlier finding in the benchmarking study that non- than in 
the UK-whilst, in addition, non-permanency is more positively related to high pay in the 
latter country'' What is perhaps most striking is the very strong results for self-reported 
over-qualification in each of the four countries. That is, if workers are badly matched in 
10  The authors are  grateful  to  Juan Prieto Rodriguez of the University of Oviedo for carrying out these 
regressions on their behalf. 
11  Cf. Benchmarking Low-wage and High-wage Employment, Table 70. 74  European-American Employment Gap 
the sense that they cannot obtain a job commensurate with their qualification this has a 
large  depressing effect on  their reported levels  of job satisfaction.  The percentage  of 
workers reporting themselves as  over-qualified is,  however, surprisingly high - 58% in 
the UK, 36% in the Netherlands, 62% in Germany and 52% in France. 
It should be noted that other studies (e.g. Clark and Oswald (1996), Bender and Sloane 
(1998) and Sloane and Williams (2000)) have found stronger effects of earnings on job 
satisfaction  using  different  data  sets.  As  for  the  U.S.,  Donahue and Heywood (2000) 
found  as  in  those British  studies  that job satisfaction increases  in  actual  earnings  and 
decreases in predicted earnings, so that the greater the gap between actual and predicted 
earnings, the greater the job satisfaction. Yet there are some important differences in the 
determinants  of job satisfaction  in  the  United States  and  Britain.  Thus  in  the  United 
States  women  do  not report  greater satisfaction, ceteris paribus,  than  men.  Explaining 
these cross country differences remains an important issue for future research. 
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Table 4.9  Overall job satisfaction using EHPS- All Workers,  1997 Ordered Probit 
United  Netherlands  Germany  France 
Kingdom 
Constant  0.579  1.064***  0.147  0.621* 
1995  -0.163**  -0.152***  -0.235***  -0.104** 
1996  0.054  -0.159***  -0.369***  -0.115** 
Gender (Female = 1)  0.183*  -0.076*  0.077  -0.034 
University Education  -0.217  -0.288***  -0.079  -0.125 
High School Education  -0.123  -0.061  -0.024  -0.069 
Married  -0.102  0.091 **  0.006  0.004 
No. of  Dependent Children  0.132***  -0.014  -0.022  0.009 
Domestic Hours (children)  -0.000  0.001  0.001  -0.001 
Domestic Hours (Other)  0.579  -0.004  -0.001  -0.001 
Previous Unemployment  0.005  -0.009*  -0.034**  -0.045** 
Potential Experience  -0.015  -0.35***  -0.021 **  -0.008* 
Pot. Exp. Squared  0.001 ***  0.001 ***  0.001 **  0.000 
Tenure  -0.072***  0.001  -0.015  -0.010 
Tenure Squared  0.004*  -0.000  0.001  0.000 
Hours Worked  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.004** 
Log of Hourly Wage  -0.020  -0.016**  0.089**  0.034* 
Predicted Wage  -0.216  0.151  0.192  0.101 
Overtime Hours  0.004  0.001  -0.002  0.008 
Employer Childcare  -0.110  -0.025  0.048  0.029 
Employer Health Benefits  0.192***  0.033  0.053*  0.016 
Employer Training  0.266***  0.071 **  0.246***  0.099** 
H'hold Finances Adequate  0.299***  0.134***  0.237***  0.198*** 
Good Financial Situation  0.202  0.082***  0.102***  0.207*** 
Good Health  0.309*  0.781 ***  0.583***  0.437*** 
Public Sector  -0.024  0.011  0.043  0.235** 
Supervisory Job  -0.008  0.093*  0.242***  0.317*** 
Part-time  0.295***  0.087**  0.021  0.055 
Manager  0.492***  0.073  0.267***  0.224** 
Professional  0.373***  0.020  0.321 ***  0.311 *** 
Associate Professional  0.298***  0.010  0.159***  0.216*** 
Clerk  0.093  -0.083  0.052  0.023 
Service Employee  0.135*  0.037  0.137**  0.036 
Skilled  0.259  -0.051  0.101  -0.008 
Industrial Sector  0.430**  0.055  -0.021  0.077 
Service Sector  0.030  -0.041  -0.014  -0.080** 
Size< 20  0.287***  0.052  0.067  0.076* 
Size 20 < 100  0.171**  0.083*  -0.025  0.033 
Over-qualified  -0.325***  -0.130***  -0.246***  -0.301 
Foreign Language  -0.205  0.033  -0.031  0.063 
Permanent Contract  0.116  0.086*  0.165***  0.002 
Other Family Income  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000 
Inverse Ratio  -0.054  0.057  -0.022  0.000 
Mu1  1.205  1.269  1.076  1.208 
Mu2  2.617  3.142  2.810  3.250 
No. of Observations  3493  13499  12052  13296 
Log Likelihood  -4460.267  15184.99  14495.23  15154.62 
***Significant at the 0.01level; **Significant at the 0.05 level;* Significant at the 0.10 level 76  European-American Employment Gap 
List of Underlying Reports 
All benchmarking results are reported in: 
Wiemer  Salverda  (Amsterdam  Institute  for  Advanced  Labour  Studies  AlAS,  University  of 
Amsterdam),  Brian  Nolan,  Bertrand  Maitre  (both  Economic  and  Social  Research  Institute 
ESRI, Dublin) and Peter Mlihlau (Technical University Eindhoven), Benchmarking Low-Wage 
and High-Wage  Employment  in  Europe  and the  United  States,  A  study of New  European 
Datasets and National Data for France,  Germany, the Netherlands,  the United Kingdom and 
the  United  States,  May  2001.  This  report  will  be  made  available  via  the  website  of the 
European Commission's DG Employment and Social Affairs. 
The following research is available in a working-paper format through the website of the LoWER 
network (www.uva.nl/aias/lower): 
Peter Gottschalk (Boston College), Wage Mobility within and between Jobs 
Geralt Nekkers and Andries de  Grip (University of Maastricht), Skills,  Wage  Dispersion and 
Wage Mobility in the 1990s: The case of  the Netherlands, Germany and France 
Stephen Bazen (Universite Montesquieu, Bordeaux), Youth and Earnings Mobility: the Case of 
France in a comparative Framework 
Rannia Leontaridi (University of Stirling)and Peter Sloane (University of Aberdeen), Measuring 
the Quality of  Jobs: Promotion Prospects, Low Pay and Job Satisfaction 
Sara Connolly (University of East Anglia) and Mary Gregory (University of Oxford), Changing 
Status: Women's Part-time Work and Wages in the United Kingdom 
Peter Mtihlau (Technical University Eindhoven) and Justine Horgan (University of Groningen), 
Cognitive Skills,  Job  Requirements and Labour Market and Wage  Position - Evidence from 
the International Adult Literacy Survey 
The following paper summarised the results for a seminar organised by the DG ESA on 8 June 
2001 in Brussels and is equally available through the network's website: 
Wiemer Salverda, Stephen Bazen and Mary Gregory,  The European-American Jobs Gap,  Low-
Wage and High-Wage Employment, Earnings Mobility and Job Quality 
I European-American Employment Gap  77 
Literature 
(for more references see the working papers) 
Burtless, G.  (ed.) (1990), A Future of  Lousy Jobs?: The Changing Structure of  U.S.  Wages', The 
Brookings Institution, Washington. 
Donohue, S.M. and Heywood, J.  S., Job Satisfaction, Comparison, Income and Gender: Are the 
U.S.  and Britain Different?, unpublished manuscript, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, 
November 2000 
Freeman, R.B.  (1998),  'Low-Wage Employment: Is  More or Less Better?', in Lucifora, C.  and 
Salverda, W.  (eds.), Policies for Low Wage Employment and Social Exclusion, Franco Agneli 
for the European Low Wage Employment Network (LoWER), Milano. 
Katz, L.F. and K.M. Murphy (1992): "Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-87: Supply and Demand 
Factors", Quarterly Journal of  Economics 107: 35-78 